

209 Class

Book V465

General Theological Seminary Library

CHELSEA SQUARE, NEW YORK

PRESENTED BY

Mrs. C. M. Roome

CORPUS CHRISTI

AND OTHER ESSAYS

CORPUS CHRISTI

and OTHER ESSAYS

by the

REV. ROBERT VAUGHAN

RECTOR OF EDMUNDBYERS

AUTHOR OF "STONES FROM THE QUARRY," ETC.

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY

1906

All rights reserved

204

V465

70887

MAILED OCT 1950

Y2A981

NOV 1950

To my faithful friend

THE REV. D. S. BOUTFLOWER

VICAR OF MONKWEARMOUTH

I DEDICATE THESE STUDIES IN

“THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCES”

PREFACE

WHEN I became Rector of this parish two years ago, I found standing on the re-table a cross with a wooden figure of the dead Christ upon it. The cross itself had been covered over with gilt-paint, which in places had peeled off, so that the material of the cross had been blackened by the fumes from a defective heating-apparatus. The result was, that the cross had all the appearance of being nothing but cast iron coated with paint, to make it resemble gold. A faculty was obtained to remove the cross and to substitute for it one of brass; for it was felt that we must have *a new one*. When, however, a church cleaning was taking place, it was discovered that that which we had supposed to

be nothing but cast iron, was itself the very thing we desired to possess—a fine brass cross. The gilt-paint has been removed, and the representation (the mis-representation) of the crucified Christ too; and there now shines out in rich colour the symbol, and a parable, of “the faith which was once delivered unto the saints.” “Let him that readeth understand.”

R. V.

EDMUNDBYERS RECTORY,
July 9, 1906.

CONTENTS

CORPUS CHRISTI.	PAGE I	<i>In carnal</i>
THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD	45	<i>Resurrect</i>
DIVINE FORE-KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM.	83	<i>Free will & det minism</i>
THE ATONEMENT	110	<i>atonement</i>
THE KINGDOM OF GOD	133	<i>Kingdom of God</i>
SOME ASPECTS OF THE EUCHARIST	160	<i>Eucharist</i>

CORPUS CHRISTI

THAT "the word was made (or became) flesh," that "Jesus Christ is come in the flesh," that He is God incarnate, forms an integral part of the Christian faith. Widely differing schools of thought accept this article of the creeds. And even, as we have recently seen, while some of these doubt or deny the "supernatural" circumstance of His birth of the Virgin, they nevertheless accord to Him divinity as to His person, and a humanity which includes the body of flesh.

From very early Christian times controversy beat tumultuously about the question of the nature of the Lord's body. We see in S. John's first Epistle evidence of the denial of the reality of the human body of Christ which characterised the Docetæ and certain other Gnostics. S. John, however, emphatically asserts the necessity of holding that Jesus had a body of flesh: "Every spirit that confesseth

not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God; and this is that spirit of anti-christ" (1 John iv. 3). And so the Church emphatically rejected the doctrine of the Docetæ, and affirmed the reality of the Lord's body. This shows how tenacious the first faith of the Church was of a veritable Incarnation. And it clung to this faith even though there was much to dispose it to differentiate Christ in all respects from the rest of humanity, and to take, as some would say, a less carnal and more "spiritual" conception of Him.

It might appear at first sight, that the more exalted the conception of His personality, the more vivid the faith and vision of Him as God, the more strong would be the tendency to attribute to Him an uniqueness in the nature of His body. Yet we find the opposite to be the case. It is S. John, the writer suspected by some of taking a too exalted view of Jesus, the apostle to whom He is in the fullest sense God-with-us, who most emphatically asserted the reality of Christ's body—that He came "in the flesh." And this fact assumes an importance in the mind of S. John, the reasons for which do not present them-

selves at a glance. Indeed, he may have never considered those reasons ; although it would be possible to infer from his Gospel some of the reasons which he might have given. But it is most likely that he attached so much importance to every fact concerning his Lord, that as a mere fact, without any present perception of its import and significance, he would have tenaciously defended it from contradiction. We have reason to believe, in spite of all suggestions to the contrary, that the apostles and evangelists set themselves to testify to facts because they were facts, apart from their perception of what they involved ; and that the early Church also carefully followed in their wake.

It may appear to us a comparatively unimportant matter whether the material of the body which Jesus had after His resurrection was the same material which lay in the grave. There are some Christian theologians to whom the material of His resurrection body is immaterial ; but the early Church would not have said so. They would have asked, "What is the fact?" And that which they knew as fact they handed on as an integral part of the

Gospel. And whatever is the truth concerning the body of Christ, we may feel assured that it contains within it that which at some time and in some way will subserve that informing and forming of the human mind which is for the soul's health. Nothing concerning the Son of God is insignificant. The nature of the body of Christ is peculiarly significant for this age; and that which it makes manifest is, in my opinion, precisely *the* truth which those need who are inclined to pass over and put on one side the traditional faith of the Church concerning it.

Why should there have been an Incarnation? Why should the Son of God have become flesh? Why was the Word clothed with a human body? or indeed with any body whatsoever? The revelation of God to man is, and must be, of spirit to spirit; and the activity of God upon and within man must also be by spirit upon spirit. This seems to render an Incarnation unnecessary and even undesirable, lest it should import into the relation between God and man a veil which must in a measure conceal the true nature of God,

and even convey false "anthropomorphic" conceptions of Him. But we must believe that, whatever may have been the particular reasons for the Incarnation, the final purpose must have been that very spiritual communion and energetic action which, had they existed or been possible, would have rendered it unnecessary. It was, we may safely affirm, because this proper spiritual fellowship did not exist, that another medium of communication, so unlike it, was adopted.

But was it then impossible to institute, or re-establish, this immediate spiritual intercourse? It could not in itself be absolutely impossible; or the spiritual power of God would be limited in itself. But there might be some sufficient ground why that power, unlimited in itself, should be limited in its action. The direct activity of God upon the human soul, to be certain of effect, must be irresistible. Such action, however, would have destroyed man's freedom, which it is a part of the divine method to leave intact. On the other hand, if the direct activity of God did not amount to "irresistible grace," then the will of man would be able to successfully

resist that which is immediately the spiritual action of God. In other words, the sin against the Holy Ghost would be of necessity the sin of all who sinned. And as the consequence is such, that for *it* there is no forgiveness, it involving an irreparable damage to the soul, we can well see that another method of appeal to the mind of man might be preferred.

“The Son of Man” does not present God to man immediately, as spirit to spirit; nor does He present at the first the vision of God. “The Son of Man” is first perceived as a humanity, and He appeals by what may be called the suggestive method, through the ordinary channels of knowledge. To disbelieve in Him and to sin against Him is indeed sin; but it does not carry in it the turpitude and damage of direct sin against the Holy Ghost. Only the humanity is seen, and only the humanity is rejected. Should, however, faith and obedience be given to the Son of Man, that which is touched thereby is full of the life of God, which fulness consequently raises the believer into spiritual life, and so spiritual fellowship is restored. The greatest possibility

of grace and truth is placed within the reach of man, in a manner which leaves free play to his will, and with the minimum possibility of moral damage if he refuses to take advantage of it. For, doubtless, God is careful to provide that human sin shall do as little harm to the spiritual nature as possible.

· We come now to the consideration of the doctrine of the Docetæ ;—that the body of Christ was not really human, but only so in appearance. It may be asked,—Would not such a body have been sufficient for the purposes stated above ? If Christ had *seemed* only to be flesh, and *seemed* to suffer human wants, pain, and death, would not this have given a sufficiency both of revelation and of power ? It is impossible for us to say what was or was not necessary without considering the divine procedure itself ; but we may affirm that if a body like ours in appearance only, met all the conditions necessary for our redemption, it is highly probable that it would have been made to serve. For it is no unanswerable objection, that God could not employ a semblance. We are largely educated by

illusions, being led by the semblances of reality to a knowledge of the real.

“Things are not what they seem.”

The objection to the Docetic doctrine will be found to be something more than the fact that it involves the idea of unreality.

Some necessity must have existed for a veritable Incarnation. I pass by the discussion of the meaning of “necessity” as applicable to divine procedure ; observing only, that it is a self-determined necessity. Whether we can discover wherein this necessity lay or not, we can be certain it existed. The explanation of the “Cur Deus Homo” is not satisfactory ; because, though human sin may have enhanced the necessity, and brought about the issue of the crucifixion of the Son of God, it is almost, some would say quite, certain that the Incarnation would have taken place if sin had not entered into the world. We may look for the reason for it in some end larger than, and apart from, the atonement for sin.

The Incarnation may be considered as a necessity of the divine nature—*i.e.* as having its roots and causes in that which God is. Or

it may be viewed as necessary on account of man's condition and needs. These two run into each other, and are so conjoined and intertwined, that they will be best considered together.

Man, on his part, needs a true and evidenced revelation of God. And such a manifestation of Himself, will make it clear that He has a complete and accurate knowledge of humanity. It is a common conception that the Son of God learned the lot of man—his temptations, weaknesses, sufferings and fears; and carried all that knowledge up to His Father's heart by intercession. There is this much truth in the idea; namely, that which for us was non-existent becomes evidently existent—God's complete comprehension of human experience. But, since the divine does not acquire knowledge, but possesses all ideas independently of experience, God in and of Himself always possessed the grounds of perfect fellowship and sympathy with humanity. If it may be said that divinity is latent in man, it may be said with more certainty that humanity is actual in God. And that means a necessary movement within Him towards Incarnation. It

must not, however, be supposed that a movement to a thing in God implies that it must be accomplished, or there would be no freedom in God's action. There would need to be a sufficient occasion; and the occasion for Incarnation must be sought in the needs of man.

The study of causation leads me to the conclusion, that all causes exist in that which is super-physical and spiritual; and that whatever exists in idea, or spiritual type, may become existent in the order of external being—in what we know under time and space. That in His spiritual self-hood God came down to, and had a perfect concept of, man, and of all which he was capable of becoming, and that, so to speak, He carried that up to and realised it in Himself, we must believe. Spiritually, that is the correspondent, the archetypal idea, of Incarnation. And *that*, God could will to become a fact in the natural order. Under certain circumstances it might become an obligation (if that term is allowable)—a moral necessity. In this sense the Incarnation is the necessary outcome of what is in God.

But it is equally a necessity on man's

account, if he is to realise that which is in God. For if we assume, as we may, that man was created that he might possess or attain full fellowship with his Creator, then the fact in God must become a fact for man—an Incarnation. According to this line of thought, although sin and the falling away from fellowship with the divine order of life, would not originate the necessity for an Incarnation, it would increase it and in certain respects modify the issues. But whatever different issue sin might introduce—as, for example, the crucifixion—the final purpose would remain the same. We may therefore expect to find intimations of the final purpose of the Incarnation in the New Testament, and when we know the end we shall be near understanding the beginning. We shall obtain a clue to the method in the Incarnation.

The final purpose of the Incarnation will be attained in that which is the end of the ascension of Christ—"that he might fill all things." Then God will be "all in all"; then "the creation itself will be delivered from the bondage of corruption." This transmutation and glorification of *things* will, as the above expressions

show, be by an in-working. God acts by energy ; that is, according to the law that causes are spiritual. The new knowledge concerning matter shows how it is peculiarly fitted to receive this entrance into it of divine energy.

Another important point is, that this end for all things is intimately connected with man—is, in some way, dependent upon man ; for it is to follow upon the redemption and glorification of man. The lordship of man over the order of nature is taught alike in the Old and in the New Testament. What he is, determines what it is. And therefore, before Christ can fill all things, He must fill man. Hence we observe that the method of His work was to begin within man, as being the way to remove all evil, not only moral but physical.

If we have an adequate grasp of these points, we shall perceive that the Incarnation was directed to something further than the revelation of God *to* man ; that it was to secure, and was the beginning of, the in-working of Him in humanity, that He ultimately might inhabit both men and things. For reasons into which we need not now inquire, God was not content

to destroy the fallen humanity and the degenerated cosmos, but He will take hold of and recover and perfect them. And this He will do by in-working in spiritual causation. It seems to follow that the Docetic doctrine is unsatisfactory, since a mere appearance would not realise this end.

Since the method of redeeming men and things is by God entering into them, there is no violent destruction, no subversion, of the natural order, but such an use of it as shall cause it to yield a higher result. The miracles of Christ are illustrations of this principle. They are not contradictions of nature and natural law, but an infusion into them of energy which brings out effects differing from the ordinary phenomena, but effects which are potentially latent within them. We should expect, therefore, that the Incarnation will follow the lines of the existing order of nature, although the event itself will be in seeming contradiction with that which is natural. This, I believe, will be found to be the case when we come to examine the matter more fully.

Before doing this, however, our attention

must be given to a view of the Incarnation which has found favour with some, because it seems to do away with the difficulties connected with the traditional faith. I mean the supposition that, at some period subsequent to conception and birth, the Divinity entered into the man Jesus and completely possessed Him. This is thought to have taken place at the baptism. This seems such a safe temporary shelter for those who are in doubt about the Virgin-birth and yet hold to the fact of Incarnation, that one might be inclined to let it stand to serve that purpose. But the issues are too tremendous.

What are we to understand by the Divinity possessing the man? Is it by the means of a full and complete inspiration of the Holy Ghost exalting the human consciousness and powers into full union with God? That would leave the personality still human, and Jesus only a man, however exalted. This in principle would not differ from the inspiration of the prophets. If Incarnation means more than this, it must be the communication of a divine Personality to the man Jesus. That would be a true Incarnation; but that is not so simple as may be imagined. For if it be supposed that the Deity

took possession of an already existing body and soul, it must be remembered that prior to Incarnation that body and soul must have been the habitation of a human personality—of a human consciousness endowed with will, and all which these imply. And this being is God's own creation. This being, however, must be destroyed, this personality be annihilated, if the Incarnation of Deity is to be accomplished in his flesh. It would be possible, so far as the divine power is concerned ; but it would be a distinct violation of the divine method. The only case of what can be the killing out of the human consciousness and will of which we have any knowledge, is in demoniacal possession. Such action on the part of God would be more than an act of power, it would express character and possess a moral quality. And it is difficult to imagine that He would destroy a personality (a stronger term might be used) which had not sacrificed his right to continuity of being.

There is another point which deserves notice, though it is one on which we cannot speak confidently, since our knowledge is not clear and certain. It is this: The body so adopted could scarcely be the body of the One in-

carnate, in a perfect sense. It is becoming a matter of belief that the body we have, and which we have employed as the organ of our life, receives the impress of ourselves, and is in its acquired aptitudes a certain part of us; that we are not as independent of our bodies as we are of our clothes, which can be put on or off and leave our personality unaffected. There is much to be said for this intimate connection of self and body. And if it be a fact, then the body of a man assumed and appropriated by the Deity would retain the impress of that man; and before it could become a true organ of another personality, that impress would have to be effaced.

That God should destroy a human personality, and possibly have to reconstruct the body, in order to incarnate Himself, would be a real contradiction and upsetting of the natural order, and more miraculous than if He should form for Himself a body from the beginning.

The supposition which we are considering involves also a difficulty which even the semblance of indelicacy does not justify us in ignoring. The man Jesus, on this supposi-

tion, had been born of human parents, and we must infer, of Joseph and Mary. But he was, according to S. Matthew's Gospel, conceived before marriage ; and the man in whom God chose to incarnate Himself was a bastard ! And subsequently a circumstantial story is fabricated, into which even God is introduced, to cover up the sin and shame of the parentage of Jesus, the Christ of God !

So weighty are the objections to this theory of the Incarnation, that they hang about it like a load of lead, heavy enough to sink it in our estimation to the lowest level.

We are thus carried back to the conception as the time of the Incarnation.

If Jesus was not born of a virgin, then he had a human father, presumably Joseph. And then the Deity took possession of the humanity by, or in conjunction with, the conception of the human father. It is not enough to suppose in a vague manner that the divine Fatherhood is a sublimely spiritual activity which has nothing to do with conception in its physical aspect. We are under the necessity of asking what is connoted by the affirmation of the

Incarnation without the Virgin-birth. It is quite correct to say that the divine Fatherhood is by the Holy Spirit alone ; but that does not exclude a physical issue. All physical phenomena issue from the Spirit of God, and the Fatherhood of God is purely spiritual. (I may say here, that I believe it will be found that human conception is also from the spirit of the father, though through a physical medium.) Fatherhood, as we know it, involves the origination of the new personality and the physical organ which it inhabits. In natural conception the new personality is the product of the father alone, and not, as some have supposed, a new creation by a special act of the Creator ; and thus, personality and the conception of the physical organ are, according to *natural* order, both from one source—the father. To suppose, then, that the personality of Jesus proceeded from God and the conception of the physical organ from Joseph, is a complete contradiction of the natural order, and makes neither of them father in the full sense of the term.

If it be affirmed that in very truth Joseph was the human father and God the divine Father, then Jesus must have had *two* fathers ;

and, according to the law of fatherhood, *two* personalities, and *two* organs, or bodies, answering to the personalities. Such a view does not lessen but increases that very element which it is sought to get rid of by the denial of the Virgin-birth—the abnormal, the exceptional, the miraculous. The co-operation of God with a human conception involves irreconcilable contradictions. If He communicated the personality without Joseph, Joseph was not the father of Jesus; and if Joseph gave the personality, whatever holy activity God infused into Jesus therewith, God was not the Father. And again, if Jesus was begotten of Joseph before wedlock, in fornication, we should have the Deity co-operating by the Holy Ghost in an act of fornication in order to become incarnate in the offspring!

The more we look into the supposition of a veritable Incarnation without the Virgin-birth, the greater are the difficulties which present themselves. The difficulties are increased in the physical sphere, and they are insuperable in the psychological, the moral, and the spiritual. The Virgin-birth is not only more beautiful in comparison, but it is more in accord with natural

law. Indeed it may, and I venture to think will, yet be discovered to be the interpretation of the divine method of progressive development.

We have now to examine the Virgin-birth itself, which to some appears unnatural, abnormal, unnecessary, and impossible. It is possible that some minds may wish to be relieved of it as an article of the faith because it appears to them not to be consonant with a pure spiritual being to use conception as a way into humanity. It appears to me that this sentiment is due to a too superficial consideration of the matter, and to the introduction, it may be quite unconsciously, of that physical aspect into it which is rigorously excluded both by S. Matthew and by our creed—"conceived by the Holy Ghost."

I have already referred to the nature of causation—that the causes of things are spiritual. In their first and fundamental energy they are in what is non-phenomenal—in invisible activity, which in its source is personal. This is true of the creation as a whole (Heb. xi. 3), and therefore of all things in it. The conception by the activity of the Holy Spirit

would therefore, because of the exclusion of a physical agent, be no contradiction of the first law of nature. It would be only a reversion to the fundamental principle of causation, because a sufficient occasion had arisen.

A consequence of this law of causation is, that there will be a similarity, a "likeness," between the spiritual cause and the event in nature. When there is this correspondence between the natural event and the spiritual fact which it embodies, no matter how exceptional the event may be, there is no contradiction of nature, but conformity with it; whereas an unlikeness would be a contradiction—a defiance of the method of nature. Applying this to the matter under consideration: If the personality—the essential being of Jesus—came from God and not from the human race, then, to have had a human father would have made a break in the correspondence between the fact and the form. If Jesus Christ was unique as to His person—and He *was*—then He ought to be unique as to His body, or the natural event would not tell the truth. The whole question of symbolism deserves an attention it does not receive.

.

And now as to the conception itself: Although in a paper like this it is not possible to enter into a detailed discussion of the subject, a general view may be presented. And I maintain that nothing which is known to science excludes the possibility of the Virgin-birth. I will go further, and say, that the more we know of the facts of nature, the more we are justified in holding that the conception of Jesus without a human father, while unique, is yet not abnormal, but only a special employment of a natural process.

The human body begins in a single cell. A certain change in that one cell constitutes its fertilisation. When that change has taken place motherhood accomplishes everything else. By science we know that a certain means causes that change in the primary cell, but it does not tell us that it *cannot* be effected by other means. The same state of a thing requires the same cause, but the same cause does not necessitate the same means. For example, the sense of light is caused by a certain excitation of the optic nerve by a movement upon the visual organ from without ; but the same state may be produced from

within, as in dreams or illusions, by a mental action on the optic nerve. The cause is the same, the means different ; in each case the nerves are employed, and in each case the process is according to nature. Now, in conception the state of the cell which constitutes fertilisation, *if* it could be produced by some other means than those from without, that state and all which follows upon it would be in strict conformity with nature.

We come now to another point, the presence of a power to fertilise the cell apart from the ordinary means. Let us first look at this from the standpoint of the present knowledge of nature, though increased knowledge will probably strengthen our contention.

The great advance which has recently been made in the knowledge of the constitution of all "matter," brings us to an idea which science may not articulate as yet, but we venture to do so for it ; namely, that all elements and their properties are in their basis *one* ; and that matter in the nerve tissue and in the crystal are fundamentally the same thing ; but that this ONE, whatever it is, gives now one set of phenomena and now another.

It appears as *a b c*; but it appears elsewhere as *x y z*. In itself it has that which becomes either upon certain conditions. Now, we come to this important fact, that that which is the being of one thing contains latent within it every other thing. The power that writes 1 can write 2 or 3, and so on. It does not write 1 and 3 in the same instant at the same point, but it can write either as easily as the other, and without any departure from the law of things. And, applying this to the matter in hand, the power which gives existence to the unfertilised cell, has in it the power of a fertilised cell. It cannot be both at the same point and instant, but it may be in different points simultaneously, and at the same point successively. And it would be no interference with the law of things if—a sufficient occasion having arisen—it became a fertilised cell, or, as we should say, set up a new state in that cell.

It may be observed, in passing, that any interpretation of nature which involves a oneness of basic being, involves also a personal will in order to the existence of any variation in its expression of itself.

This is all contained in our Christian faith. We believe that God in the fulness of His being permeates all things, while in Himself He transcends all. The whole Deity is at every point of space and in every one fact of creation ; although not comprehended in space nor in that or any facts. The whole power of God is where He acts, and it is within His power to alter the state of any existent thing without altering its fundamental law of being. This He can do by an exertion of Himself, by a pure spiritual activity. And, that He who makes man male and female should change an unfertilised cell into a fertilised one is alike consonant with His creation and with the most exalted conception of His nature.

What is contended for in all this is no mere physical miracle, but a great and gracious spiritual truth—namely, that He who was born at Bethlehem was indeed the Son of God, and that the manner of His birth is in itself both the testimony to the gospel of our redemption and the redemption of the whole creation ; and also the revelation and the beginning of the process by which it will be accomplished.

The subsequent growth of the body of the

Lord and the unfolding of the personality would proceed on the same lines as in any other case, with only such variation from ordinary growth as might be involved in the personality. The "growth" of personality is so far beyond our knowledge, that we can only say that any "mystery" in the case of Jesus is equally present in every unfolding of a human personality.

God in human flesh involves two possibilities ; an influence of the flesh on the indwelling Personality and an influence of the Personality on the human flesh.

By Incarnation the divine Personality becomes subject to whatever are necessary conditions of dwelling in flesh, as physical sensations, desires, and limitations. Again, human brain and nerve involve human soul. Then follows the acquisition of knowledge of certain kinds by experience and inference. Human reason and intelligence, if not the consequences of flesh, are the concomitants of it. Moral conflict emerges and all which it necessarily implies, but it does not imply moral defect. The consciousness of the Son of God in flesh and His activities, are thus

placed, or place themselves, under very marked limitations of knowledge and action. This appears, at first sight, a complete contradiction of Divinity proper. A limited Deity, or Deity in limitations, seems incongruous. But it must be remembered that a limitation which is self-imposed for a particular purpose and period, is widely different from a limitation imposed from without, and which is, like man's limitation, a necessary attribute of the personality itself. The latter is essential and actual; the former is not a limitation within the being, who possesses and can use all his powers whenever he determines to put them forth. God does not cease to have all power by not using all the power He has. And God under the self-selected conditions of the Incarnation no more ceases to be God than one would cease to be a philosopher by leaving off philosophising to play with a child. But in the play all the philosopher would be there, and would give character to the relationship. God in the limitations of flesh sees, and judges, and feels, and acts with a perfection which is infinite in its intension and accuracy. The very humanity is one with God.

This introduces a point which has been

privately brought to my notice by one who is a distinguished teacher in another department of knowledge and a willing learner in this. He states that the revelation of God in Jesus Christ cannot possibly be a full revelation. This must be admitted, if, as is meant, we understand the revelation given *in the flesh*. And he seems to imply that Jesus cannot therefore be God Incarnate in the full sense, or Divinity itself. The first thing to notice is, that a full revelation, in the sense implied, can never be given—*communicated*—to the finite creature. A full revelation, in a true sense, is one which is adequate, adapted to the requirements of the case, and which is true, because further knowledge will only enlarge, not contradict, it. Such a revelation is not excluded by the limitations of the flesh ; because, although the medium through which the revelation is given imposes limitations, yet, when that which is manifested by the flesh is apprehended, there always follows a more exalted and a true conception of God as out of flesh and transcending it. That is, by the humanity in which God is, we come to know God in the truth of His nature. That is, no doubt, a distinct purpose of the Incarnation.

But we must not leave this point without add-

ing a further remark. Admitting that in a certain sense the revelation of God in flesh is not and cannot be full—that is, not so full as may be ultimately necessary—that does not touch the question of His divinity. Even nature has not been able to reveal all which it is. For thousands of years it has been showing itself; but because we are only now finding out something of its contents, that does not say it was not what it is. Jesus Himself distinctly taught that He had to give a larger revelation of Himself and of the Father: He had many things yet to say, and the Paraclete must first come. And above all, there is the great Parousia, when He will manifest Himself “as he is.” Then the limitations will be put aside, having served their wise and gracious purpose. Limitations by Incarnation are not limitations within the personality of the One incarnating Himself.

We come now to the consideration of certain recorded changes in the body of Jesus Christ during His lifetime. It is evident from the Gospel narratives that there was no radical and permanent change in the physical nature of Christ up to the time of His death. He was subject to bodily fatigue and necessity, and the

events connected with the crucifixion show that He had a body of flesh to the last, which body was taken from the cross and laid in the tomb. But this continuity in the body did not exclude the possibility of very real changes in its condition and phenomena under special activities of His personality. Water when heated passes into a gaseous state and becomes invisible ; but on the temperature being lowered it becomes a liquid again. The change is real, but temporary. And on several occasions the body of Christ was temporarily changed.

The first was when the people of Nazareth seized Him with the intention of casting Him over the cliff : " He passing through the midst of them went his way." He did not, as on a later occasion, "hide himself" ; which the circumstances of this event did not allow. And while we ought not to suppose the miraculous where it is not necessary to the narrative, it is evident that the miraculous was in some sense present here ; and the form of it which most accords with the narrative is that Christ rendered His body invisible. It is no valid objection to say that a material body cannot become invisible. Visible matter does in

physical experiments become invisible. It is only a question of an agency which can control the inner state of "matter," and the inner state of all matter is spirit. It is no contradiction of any material law, that if its inner state is altered its outward phenomena shall vary accordingly. And that the Son of God possessed the control of the inner states of things follows from His divinity. Indeed, it may yet be discovered that the control of matter is an attribute of man in his perfected powers. This incident is the more credible because it is in accord with others which are unquestionably miraculous.

Christ's walking upon the sea furnishes another instance of a change in His body. It might have been due to the attribute of solidity, or power of resistance, being communicated to the water. But in view of the experience of S. Peter, that so long as his faith held he did not sink, and did so when it failed, it would appear that the variation was in *him* and not in the water. This is in favour of the opinion that it was some change in Christ's body which enabled Him to walk upon the sea. It might be said that He suspended the law of gravi-

tation ; but it would be more in harmony with the order of things, and with the observable character of our Lord's miracles, that the law of gravitation should in no way be interfered with. It is more reasonable to believe that He partially liberated His body from the condition which rendered it subject to the influence of gravitation. We know so little of what that influence is, that it cannot be affirmed that substance in all its states must be subject to that power. And, since the new knowledge of matter points to inner affinities as the causes of the interaction of matter, the control of His body which He possessed would enable Christ to suspend its affinities without suspending any law of nature. That S. Peter should participate in this immunity from the attraction of gravitation, seems to suggest that the miracles of Jesus are the revelation of principles and activities which under given conditions—the redeemed life, it may be—are universal and constant.

“The Transfiguration was a splendid episode, typifying the dignifying and dominating of matter by the indwelling spirit.” This, from the distinguished scientist Sir Oliver Lodge

(*Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1906), is an admission of far-reaching significance, and an affirmation of the possible modification of material phenomena by an inward activity, which is a valuable contribution to Theology. When our Lord described the Transfiguration six days before as "the kingdom of God coming with power," He implied that it was a revelation of what the kingdom of God would be in power and effect, an unfolding of the manner in which all things would be subjected to Him. The Transfiguration was more than a "vision"—a subjective state of the imagination, a kind of illusion. Indeed any change in mental state or perception requires some objectivity, something imported from without, to effect the change; and the something must be equal to the change effected. A state of perception would be uniform unless a new factor were introduced. And even if we suppose that the Transfiguration was a subjective experience of the beholders, the miraculous would not be eliminated, since a power to effect such extraordinary states of mind, in three persons wholly unprepared for such an experience, would itself be miraculous. It is no more remarkable that

Christ should be able to change His body than that He should be able to transform the minds of the three beholders. And even if we did not know of the power of matter to give out new phenomena by a spiritual action within it, we should be required by the narrative itself to believe that the body of the Lord did verily undergo a change—He “*was transfigured before them.*” There was no dissipation of His body, no removal or exchange of its substance. The natural body was not destroyed, nor radically altered, for it came back to its ordinary condition on the withdrawal of the transforming power. An experiment in chemistry with these marks and features would be a proof of the transmutability of the substance dealt with, and also a proof that the old substance is contained in the new. That, we claim, is proved in the Transfiguration—Christ could transmute His very flesh and bones, and clothing even, so that they would be no longer corruptible matter, but the glorious organ of His unlimited life. The Transfiguration leads up to a right faith in the Resurrection, which we have now to consider.

The Resurrection of Jesus Christ has too

frequently been dealt with as an isolated event, and the nature of His Resurrection body viewed quite apart from the phenomena connected with His body which we have had under our attention. The principal, if not all, changes in it at the Resurrection which the traditional faith asserts, were made manifest in it in the course of the Lord's life. It became invisible to sense, it was liberated from the attraction of gravitation, and it was transmuted into, and invested with the attributes of, that state in which Moses and Elias were—the state of spiritual beings in a spirit-world. And under all these changes the substances of His body in its prior and subsequent state remained. True, these changes were not continuous. There were reasons why they should not be. That they occurred is evidence that the body of Christ, if raised from the grave, *could* be made to take upon itself these same attributes, for a time at any rate ; and presumptive evidence that it could be thus changed permanently. It is quite possible that these manifestations were intended by our Lord to be revelations of the nature of spiritual bodies. The Transfiguration certainly may be so regarded.

An objection which has been made against the resurrection of the natural body of Christ is, that a body composed of chemical elements would be wholly unsuited to the conditions of a spiritual world. Quite so : that is precisely what S. Paul teaches when he says that "corruption" cannot "inherit incorruption"; but he believed that the Lord's natural body was verily raised. The point was mooted thus early, before the chemistry of the human body was known ; and it was met then by teaching that the nature of the body could be changed, before the *changefulness* of the inner states of atoms was dreamed of. And this doctrine of the transmutation of the substance of the body is best accounted for on the supposition that it was a general application of what had been observed and known to have taken place *in the body of the Lord*. In short, the facts concerning the Resurrection of Christ themselves contain the answer to the above objection, which could only be raised by first setting aside a most important part of the testimony of the witnesses.

That testimony which the Gospels record and the tradition of the Church confirms, I

accept in its general import. It does not enter into the plan of this paper to deal with it, but I may say that, giving the greatest reasonable weight to the difficulty of harmonising the narratives, this but lightly touches the question of the facts concerning the Lord's Resurrection—so lightly, that, in my opinion, it would have had no weight at all, if there had not been a prior objection to the miraculous from its supposed contradiction of nature. The main facts of the Resurrection stand out clear, quite apart from discrepancies in the narratives.

The form in which our Lord appeared to His disciples and others in His resurrection life, was the identical body which had lain lifeless in the tomb. Neither His bereaved friends, nor His powerful and watchful foes, could discover or produce the body upon which so much depended. It had gone, but no account of how or whither was discoverable then, nor has been invented since, which accords with the empty tomb and the appearances of Christ, except that the body which appears is the one which has disappeared. For an able discussion and refutation of the theories

invented to do away with this miraculous event, I refer you to Schaff's "History of the Church," vol. i. pp. 179 & ff. A strong argument for the identity of the body is the empty tomb. This identity will alone account for the existence of the marks in the hands and feet and side. If it be said, that the beholders would see subjectively what they expected to see—the same form even to the marks—two points may be suggested. How do we know what they would expect? If they expected to see Christ in the perfected life of the Resurrection, they might reasonably expect that all marks of the passion and injury to the body would be done away. And further, when they saw Him they did not see Him as they certainly would expect to do. They would at least expect the familiar figure, but, instead, He on several occasions appeared in forms which they did not recognise. Moreover, that the marks were not mere imaginations, is quite clear, I think, from the fact that Christ Himself called attention to them as evidence of His reality—an objective reality. At the same meeting with His disciples He also ate food before them. A vision, a subjective conception, could not take

food from the hands of the disciples and consume it, which the risen Christ did. But an objector may ask, Could a spirit assimilate material food? He would be a very superficial thinker who asserted that *our* spirits do not assimilate material food. I should feel safer in asserting that they do. And that He who had the control of the inner states of things should be able to bring matter back to what it had once been—to spirit—and assimilate it to His resurrection body, is both a reasonable belief and a helpful one; for is it not another sign that Christ can bring *all things to His own state*?

But identity of body did not involve identity of state. The same substances—even to the very bones and flesh—give out new phenomena and appear different; yes, and *are* different. Is it so very absurd?—I would ask any who may smile. Are there not surprising things coming out of the atom? And are you quite sure, when you have touched the mystic harp and brought out some few startling tones, that that is all? What about the Master Hand? The appearances and disappearances of the Lord's resurrection body are in accord with

what occurred in His prior life, but they occur in a manner which shows that a permanent change in it has taken place. It did not, however, assume one appearance ; nor does it seem as if there were a gradual alteration from the form which it had before crucifixion. To Mary Magdalene Christ seemed another person, also to the two on the way to Emmaus. It is doubtless of this latter incident that the statement is made in the addition to S. Mark's Gospel, which may be accepted as a genuine tradition, that Jesus "*appeared in another form* unto two of them." And although both S. Peter and S. John had seen Him before in His resurrection body, neither recognised Him on the shore until after the miracle. At other times there appears to have been no difficulty in recognising Christ. I am aware of the naturalistic explanations of the cases of non-recognition, but they are at best suppositions not suggested by the narratives. Those who reported the events believed that there were variations in the body itself, and I see no sufficient reason for a different opinion. In fact, the resurrection body was absolutely plastic and changeful under the power of the soul within.

This changefulness in the Lord's resurrection body points to the possibility of other changes at and after the Ascension ; by glorification, and in variations in His presentments to differing capacities in the heavenly life. But the most suggestive point is, that the disciples were to recognise their Lord by other means than bodily form, by a moral and spiritual recognition—the manner of all knowledge in the spiritual order. The facts concerning His resurrection body are revelations of the nature of all "body" and of all fellowship in that order. It is in this respect that the resurrection of Christ is the type and example of our resurrection, and not in the actual manner of the rising itself ; for in it there is a vital difference. Our bodies see corruption and return to dust, a fit symbol and consequence of moral corruption ; but since He knew no sin, it was most in accord with the harmony of things that His body should not see corruption. Had it done so, there would have been a real breach of law, for the body of flesh was the symbol and the form of the humanity which He had assumed and redeemed.

And here we touch what is one important

reason for the resurrection of Christ's body. Because, as has been stated, all causes are spiritual, and the natural event must correspond with the cause, it was necessary that the body as well as the personality of Christ should rise. And that He should thus elevate that material organ in which the fulness of God dwelt, is the promise that He will so elevate all things by filling them with Himself. The resurrection of our Lord's body is not a mere physical miracle ; it is an essential part of the Gospel of Redemption.

One other point may be touched upon. According to Lotze, the human body is made up of an assemblage of souls which the human personality dominates. These souls constitute the inner selves of every atom of the body, and being souls, they are capable of being altered by a soul agency sufficiently potent to command them, in which case they would give out new phenomena and the body would be consequently changed. This is what we see actually taking place in the body of Christ before His death, in His resurrection, and afterwards. That He should be able to re-unite Himself with that assemblage of souls which constituted His

body before they had become dispersed by dissolution, and be able to impress upon them new characteristics, was indeed a miracle, but it was in no way impossible, nor was it a contradiction of the known laws of things, but a great and gracious interpretation of them.

NOTE.—I have been asked whether our Lord had a body during the interval between death and resurrection when in Paradise. This does not properly belong to the scope of the paper, which was to deal with the body of flesh and its changes. By observing what is maintained in the essay on "The Resurrection of the Dead," my reply could be inferred. It seems to me that Christ had a spiritual body when He descended into Hades as the medium of His manifestation of Himself to the dead. But why, then, assume again the dead body? I may not be able to give the reason, but that there was a reason is certain, because He did. I seem to see two sufficient ones: He must give the best evidence of the reality of His resurrection; and, the rescue of His body from corruption must as an outward fact symbolise its rescue and the rescue of humanity from sin. To this might be added, the restoration of the matter of His body to the spiritual order is the promise of the redemption of all matter, which to me is an essential part of the Gospel. The wish has also been expressed that this essay should go on to deal with the Lord's body as it is now, and with

certain questions concerning the Holy Communion. On this latter subject something is said in the last of these essays, but not all that I might say. I think I have said enough for the present ; and if the reader will be at the trouble to understand what is written and read between the lines, he will find things are touched upon which are not mentioned.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD

THE early Church gave to this subject a degree of attention which has never been given to it at any subsequent period. This arose chiefly from the new revelation concerning it given in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and explicitly taught by the apostles. But the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, in any real sense, soon came to be disputed by certain Gnostics, on account of a supposed evil attaching itself to all matter. A shadow or semblance of this idea lingers with us still. The early writers on behalf of the orthodox doctrine, in opposing this denial of the resurrection of the matter of the body, sometimes used expressions which were rather indicative of a too materialistic view of the resurrection body. On the other hand, the teaching of the Alexandrian school, in seeking to avoid this tendency on the one side and the Gnostic position on the other, while giving

a real spiritual body, scarcely makes it the same body. It is no wonder that the more clear declaration of the resurrection of the flesh, though somewhat crudely expressed, should gain the ascendancy ; for it, after all, asserts the truth of the matter, and it was easy to grasp by the many. Easy to grasp, but easy also to limit to its easiest interpretation, as if it could have no other. A thing does not cease to be true because to understand how it is true a very great deal more meaning must be imported into it than those saw who affirmed it. It would be a most pernicious idea to say, that we cannot hold the faith of those of the first centuries of the Christian era unless we limit our ideas in all respects to the meaning they saw in the words they used.

Tertullian, in his treatise on "The Resurrection of the Flesh," represents those who believed in the restoration of the very material of the dead body. His position may be seen from the following : "You may believe that the flesh which has been consigned to the ground is able in like manner to rise again by the will of the same God" (chap. xxxv.) ; and, "For if God produced all things whatever out of nothing,

He will be able to draw forth from nothing even the flesh which had fallen into nothing ; or if He moulded other things out of matter, He will be able to call forth the flesh too from somewhere else, into whatever (abyss) it may have been engulfed " (chap. xi.). It is, however, necessary to remember that Tertullian teaches that the matter of the body undergoes a change in the resurrection. The doctrine of Origen is not so clear and so free from the possibility of misinterpretation. The following passage from his "Contra Celsum" will give in brief his position : "We, therefore, do not maintain that the body which has undergone corruption resumes its original nature, any more than the grain of wheat which has decayed returns to its former condition. But we do maintain that, as above the grain of wheat there arises a stalk, so a certain power ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$) is implanted in the body, which is not destroyed, and from which the body is raised up in incorruption " (book v. chap. xxiii.). It would seem from this, that he did not believe that the dead body which decays will be restored, but that some agency within the body (the living body appears to be necessary to make

the analogy good) at the time of death produces a spiritual body which was latent within the natural body. There is room for doubt as to the precise meaning, but none, I think, as to what he would have said if he had been living to-day. But whatever differences there were between these two schools of thought, both believed in the resurrection of the body, and, I should say, of the *same* body, though both do not believe in the resurrection of the *dead* body.

It is very important that these divergent views in the early Church should be kept in mind when considering the statements in the Creeds upon this subject. The diversity of doctrine would be well known, and, as we learn from Church history, was not ignored. We should expect to find some sign of this in the Creeds themselves. This, I think, we find in *what they do not say*. The words used are "the resurrection of *the dead*," "the resurrection of *the body*," "the resurrection of *the flesh*," and "all men shall rise again *with their bodies*." But in no one of them does it say that the dead body will rise, with Tertullian. The dead person will rise, and the body will rise ; and the wording of the "Athanasian" Creed—"with their bodies"—

almost suggests Origen's doctrine, that they had their bodies, or it admits of that view. The use of the word "flesh" in the creed of the Baptismal Office no doubt is equivalent to "body" in the other form. But, as it suggests to most minds the idea of the dead body, it may be observed that "flesh" (σάρξ) in the New Testament is used of *living* flesh, almost without exception. Those who worded our Creeds were not careful to incorporate either of the divergent views, and their statements would be satisfied by the one as much as by the other. It would be no sufficient objection to say, that the one interpretation has been generally received, unless we are prepared to settle our interpretation of the Christian Faith by the vote of the majority.

The faith of our Church on this, as on other matters of doctrine, is in accordance with the Creeds and Holy Scripture as they interpret and confirm each other. But there is one statement in the Burial Service which seems to have a definite bearing upon the point now before us. The phrase "in sure and certain hope of the resurrection to eternal life" is sometimes read and objected to as if

50 RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD

it affirmed the eternal salvation of the individual. Every Churchman knows that it is a general statement of the fact that we bury our dead with the general resurrection in our view. It has no particular person or thing in view. It does not say "its" resurrection in reference to the body interred, but "*the* resurrection." Here again there is nothing said of the rising of the dead body. It may be understood so, but it does not state it.

Until comparatively recent times this question has been allowed to rest where the early controversies left it, except that, from the decay of learning, the knowledge of the diversity of doctrine in the early Church upon it had been lost. And since the Tertullian theory, easier to be apprehended by the ordinary mind than the subtle and rather indefinite doctrine of Origen, triumphed and gained absolute possession of the field, it came to be regarded as *the* Christian doctrine and the only possible meaning of the Creeds and of Holy Scripture. Going back forty years, I can vividly recall a very painful sense of being "heretical," which others were careful to deepen as much as possible, when other thoughts came to me

and conquered. It is unfortunate that the Tertullian doctrine is the only one apparently known to most of the critics of the Christian Faith. They naturally take the common conception to be the only orthodox one ; though there is reason to suspect that, in some cases, the cruder view is purposely selected because it is so much easier to attack.

The common faith has been, that the identical body and its material, which is laid in the grave, will be restored and revived by union with the "soul" at the general resurrection, and will then be glorified and endowed with immortality. But the knowledge recently acquired of the properties of matter, and of the chemical changes in the body during life and after death, has raised difficulties which are considered by many to absolutely exclude the possibility of the dead body being restored and so changed as to be able to exist in a spiritual world. Looking carefully into this, I cannot see anything beyond the power of God, but I can see that it is not the only, nor the most probable, way of providing the spirit with a body, when we consider all which it involves. And we may safely give

up belief in the restoration of the identical material of the dead body, and, as I hope to show, continue to honestly and truthfully say in our Creed, that we believe in "the resurrection of the body." No one would ever question the orthodoxy of Bishop Harvey Goodwin, and yet he says, in his "Foundations of the Creed," p. 384, in reference to the restoration of the identical material bodies: "This view . . . is one which our present knowledge of matter and its laws renders it imperative upon all wise men to discard. Matter which appertains to one body at one time appertains to another body at another. The notion of particle being joined to particle, so as to re-form a certain body, involves an impossibility, because the same particle may have belonged to a thousand different bodies, and may be claimed by one as rightfully as by another. In fact, it is only necessary to bring the notion into contact with what we certainly know concerning material particles to break down and annihilate it." He then goes on to point out that it has not the support of the New Testament. I shall deal with this later on, though in a different way.

One very naturally and rightly asks, Why should the identical material body be restored? The old idea, that it was necessary in order that the body should share in the rewards or punishments of the good or evil done in the body, is too fanciful to deserve any serious discussion. The atoms of the body cannot sin, and they can neither deserve nor receive punishment. The restoration of the dead body, it may be said, is necessary to the continuity of man's substantial and bodily existence. If this were so, it would furnish a sufficient reason for the resurrection of the dead body. For a body is absolutely necessary to the life and circumstances of a limited being like man. The sense of his self, and manifest communion with other selves, seem to demand some kind of body. A "disembodied spirit," in the sense in which it is used, seems an impossibility. Indeed, if man needs a body in order to substantial existence after the general resurrection, as I most firmly believe, then he quite as much needs one immediately after death. If this argument has any force, it proves that man ought to have his resurrection body immediately upon death. The supposition which gives

this argument the force which it has is, that he cannot have a body, and certainly not the *same* body, unless the one discarded at death is recovered. This supposition will have to be examined, and will, I think, be fully disposed of.

It is necessary now to ask, What is the precise meaning of the expression "the resurrection of the body"? And this divides itself into two questions: What is the body? and, What is resurrection?

The body is the organised expression of life, and any organised expression of life, whatever its substance may be, is a body. It is not the material alone which constitutes it a body, but the material plus the organisation. Take away organisation, and, although all the material remains, it is not *the* body that it was; indeed, it is not a body. After death the human body is decomposed and resolved into its component elements, and even if the whole of these were kept together, that would not be the body. The body would have ceased to exist. And even if it were reorganised, it would not be the same body which existed before, but a new one. For, what is it which constitutes a body the same? Why is the body which I have

now the same that I had sixty years ago? It is not because it is the same material, for that has been completely changed a number of times, and yet it is the same body. For it is not an accurate statement to say, that we have a new body every few years. Our bodies have new constituents, just as a nation has a succession of generations, but the bodies, like the nation, are the same. That which constitutes my body the same that I had in infancy is, that the same organised expression of my personality has continued without a break; that as my personality is the same though developed, so its organised expression is the same though developed; and the material which now composes my body is there because of the material which composed it in infancy. If all these conditions are fulfilled in the resurrection, then it is the same body; but if, as is the case in the supposed restoration of the mere material of the body which has been dissolved, the essential element is wanting, it is not the same body. The same would be true of a newly created spiritual organism which had no vital connection with the former body of flesh and blood. The continuity of the organism is

necessary, at least, that it may be the same body.

It may seem to some a very unimportant matter whether the same body in any sense rises. I do not think we are in a position to say what is important and what is not, except that it is important that we know what is the Christian revelation on this matter, and that is what we are now concerned with.

We have now to look at the meaning of "resurrection." This term means "a rising up again." If the New Testament had been written in Latin, and the word "resurrectio" employed, it might have been possible to reason, as Tertullian does, that it must mean the rising up *again* of that which had fallen—namely, the dead body. But though the writers of the Greek Testament had both a verb and a noun expressing the idea of a rising again, the former is not used of the resurrection, and the latter but once, in Phil. iii. 11, where it is used of "the rising up again from among dead (persons),"—τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν. Instead of these they, with this single exception, use a verb and noun which do not carry in them the idea of rising *again*, but

only that of rising up. This térm (ἀνάστασις) properly means "a raising up" or "rising" (see Grimm and Cremer). It does not include the idea of "rising *again*"; though it does not absolutely exclude it where that sense is implied, as when used of Christ who rose again. Our Lord is reported as using the phrase, "in the resurrection" (ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀναστάσει), where the term is an equivalent for the future life; and "I am the resurrection and the life" (ἡ ἀνάστασις καὶ ἡ ζωή), where it is used for the eternal life. Compare 1 John v. 20—"This is the true God and eternal life." I have a note, which I am not able to verify, though I have no doubt it is correct, that "with Philo death was itself the ἀνάστασις, or *upstanding* of the immortal principle." The proper sense in which we should employ the word "resurrection" is thus "a raising up" or "rising," as "the raising up of the dead" or "the rising of the body." In New Testament times it *seems* to have been used as equivalent to "immortality," for the denial of the "resurrection" by the Sadducees was a disbelief in any kind of immortality, and not simply a denial of the resurrection of the body.

We come now to the chief purpose of this paper—namely, to ascertain the teaching of the New Testament upon the subject before us. That teaching is chiefly based upon and determined by the facts observed in the Resurrection of Christ. It is not necessary to repeat here what has been said in regard to that event in the essay “Corpus Christi,” to which the reader is referred. It is especially necessary to observe, however, that there is one important difference, out of which other differences arise, between the resurrection of the body of Christ and a resurrection of the dead bodies of men generally. In the case of our Lord there is no dissolution or decay of the body, but in the other cases the body is not only dead and buried—it is resolved into its constituent elements, and as a *body* has ceased to exist. This difference is a most important one, a fact which has been too generally overlooked when speaking of Christ’s resurrection as the “type” of ours. It may be, and in certain important particulars is, a type of ours, though I am not aware of any Scriptural authority for the idea. It means much more than that His resurrection is the ground and assurance of

ours, and that we rise with and in Him. Indeed the expression is open to serious misunderstanding, and has been used as an argument, that, since our dead bodies are by science proved not to rise, therefore it was quite unnecessary for Christ's dead body to be raised, since the cases are analogous. Believing, as we do, that the Lord's body did verily rise, then His resurrection is not a type of ours in every particular, for ours ceases to exist as a body, but His did not.

If we wish to follow out the idea of Christ's resurrection being a "type" of ours, we shall find the chief points to be as follows: (1) The continuity of the personality into another life in a bodily form; (2) This body is derived from and contains the very substances of the former, the natural, body; (3) Though composed of the same substances, these give off a new set of phenomena; (4) These changes are due to the new power which the personality exercises within these substances of the body. These essential and comprehensive points of likeness to our Lord's resurrection will be found in the resurrection of His people.

The most full and clear statement concerning

the resurrection is in 1 Cor. xv. The general line of reasoning pursued by S. Paul must be first attended to, and afterwards kept continuously in mind, if the subordinate points in his statement would be understood. The chapter divides itself into two parts. The former (vers. 1-34) is an argument to show the Corinthians that they are wrong in denying the resurrection of the dead ; and not, as has been often assumed, to *prove* the resurrection, which is another matter. And to do this, he proceeds to prove that Christ's resurrection forms, and always formed, a part of the Faith which they had been taught and had believed. He then shows the absurdity of a Christian, who must accept the resurrection of his Lord, and whose hope rests ultimately upon that fact being true, denying that there is, or can be, a resurrection of the dead. The argument of this matter leads him to make several affirmations which are very important as evidence of what S. Paul understood by "resurrection." If there is no resurrection, faith is vain, the dead in Christ have perished, in this life only we have hope in Christ. This would not be the case, and the reasoning would lose its force, if by resurrection S. Paul had meant the resurrection

of the dead body. For it might have been answered, that the soul could live without the body, so that the conclusions which he draws would not follow. The force of the apostle's argument lies in this, that both he and the readers understood by "resurrection" immortality, or the rising of the man into another life. To deny this resurrection was to deny any life in which the Christian hope could be fulfilled except this. .

The apostle in this use of the term "resurrection" includes that of the body, but not the dead body. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the soul, as it is called, could rise and exist apart from the body ; and so, whether he mentions the body or not, it is to be understood as included under the idea of the resurrection of the dead. The question of ver. 35 is not, therefore, whether the body rises, which for him is implied in any future life ; but there are two questions, one in regard to the *manner* of the raising, the other of the *sort* of body it will be when raised. These questions (which must be dealt with later on) are quite distinct ; but the point to be noticed here is, that they do not raise the question whether the body rises—that

is assumed throughout as included in a "resurrection," or a future life. And so we find that S. Paul implies in the last verse, that if there were no resurrection all Christian life and labour would be "in vain." As he says, in ver. 32 (R.V.), "If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die"—die absolutely.

If the above exegesis is correct, then the teaching of S. Paul is as follows:—If there is no resurrection, implying a rising of the body, there is no future state in which the righteous can live and receive their reward—all is in vain. He had no belief in the soul existing without its resurrection body—in a disembodied state; and, consequently, he held that soul and body pass together into the life of the resurrection. This, if I understand him, takes place at, and with, the change of death; for in the second epistle, chap. v. 1, he says, "If the earthly house of our tabernacle (or bodily frame) be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." "*We have*" certainly suggests that we have it when the tabernacle is dissolved. But we shall consider this point later on.

Returning to the idea of *ἀνάστασις*, we find

that S. Paul uses it as did Christ, as equivalent to a future life ; and as Philo did for the up-rising of man into a future state ; only he believed in the body participating in that up-rising, which Philo denied. But the apostle did not mean the body which had been buried and dissolved, but, as we shall see, the living body which we now have.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to make a distinction between the up-rising or resurrection of the individual at death, and the general resurrection of the dead at the last day. By the former is to be understood a rising into the spirit-world at death, by the latter the rising of the dead to those who are yet alive at the Advent. I think a distinction between these is discernible in the chapter before us. I shall first deal with some matters concerning the resurrection of the individual, and then with the general resurrection.

There are, as has been pointed out, two questions in verse 35. The former, "How are the dead raised?" has reference to the manner of the rising. This is answered in verses 36-38. There is an analogy drawn out between the rising of the dead and the quickening

and development of seed. Seed "is not quickened, except it die." That is, it is quickened in the process of dying, the new life follows immediately upon the old, its rising upon its decay. If S. Paul meant this to be a true analogy, he teaches that resurrection is the other side of death, and what follows confirms that idea. "Thou sowest not that body that shall be," is a distinct intimation that there was some sense in which the old form of the life is lost and does not rise. If, however, the dead body is raised, that is not so ; but if the outer shell of our life is thrown off and never recovered, the analogy is complete so far. That which is sown is immediately invested with a new body—"God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him." And, if we may trust to the analogy still, a new body is given to us immediately upon death. So far we have reached the same conclusions as Origen ; but here we may have to leave him. It is not quite clear what he intended to convey by "a certain power (λόγος) . . . implanted in the body . . . from which the body is raised up in incorruption" (see p. 47). If we are to understand, as I am inclined to do, a certain principle of

divine action within our bodies, by which at death we are in possession of a resurrection body, I think he had the right idea, though perhaps imperfectly perceived. From the analogy of the seed, it holds that, as the new body given to it is based upon, and evolved from, the old, so the resurrection body is based upon, and evolved from, the body which we now have. It would thus be the same body, being a transmutation of our present body, a continuity both of its organism and of its substance. The process of the formation of this body may be going on in life, but only fully brought out by death. For this reason, and others which we shall mention later, "God giveth . . . to each seed a body of its own" (*ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα*).

That a substance should be identical and yet different, is one of the things which seem to be beyond "the use of imagination in the study of science"; and even when examples lie thick about us they seldom suggest the idea. S. Paul had come to it, however; possibly because he had the temerity to believe that the phenomena connected with the historic Jesus were as much interpretations of nature as a modern miracle in a chemical experiment. Be that as it may, he

has conceived the idea, and has written it down. When he had answered his first question in a way which implies a continuity of substance, he went on to the second question—"With what manner of body do they come?" It is a question of sort or kind. There are, he points out, various sorts of flesh in natural bodies. He then declares that "there are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial"; and it may be as well to inquire how he had acquired the notion of "celestial bodies."

As a Pharisee he would be well instructed in the Rabbinical doctrine, upon which two short quotations will suffice: "The soul cannot ascend into Paradise except it be first invested with a clothing adapted to that world, as the present is for this world;" and, "When the dead in Israelitish earth are restored alive," their bodies will be "as the body of the first Adam before he sinned, and they shall all fly into the air like birds" (quoted in Alger's "Doctrine of a Future Life," pp. 166, 167). He had himself seen his risen Lord in a celestial body, and he had satisfied himself that many others had seen Him so after His resurrection. He doubtless knew of the

presence of Moses and Elias on the mount of Transfiguration in their celestial bodies,—the former although his terrestrial body had been buried *and rests still in its secret grave*. The teaching on this point received in his youth was confirmed by his own experience in mature manhood, and by that of many others. “There are also bodies celestial” is more than a guess.

The apostle is fully aware that the body suitable for celestial life must differ from that which is suitable for terrestrial life. Its “glory,” the attributes which make it perfect for that state, will differ from those which make a perfect terrestrial body; and he proceeds to state certain differences. This brings us to a point which requires to be carefully examined.

It is generally taken for granted that the expressions, “It is sown” and “it is raised,” in verses 43, 44, refer, the former to the interment of the dead body, and the latter to its being raised again at the general resurrection. But when we look closely into the apostle’s statements, there are certain of them which do not fit in with such reference. There

is no distinctive "dishonour" attaching to a body when interred, but there has always been a certain reverence given to it. The body is not buried in "weakness," but in utter powerlessness. It is not then a "soulish" body, as the term *ψυχικόν* means, for it is interred because there is no soul in it. Then, the analogy of sowing implies that it is sown for the purpose of rising, and that the rising up is the other side of the death. The "it" is not clear as to its reference—there is no previous mention of "body." And while we have body in the phrase "it is sown a natural body," it does not say the body is sown, but "it" is sown in the form of natural body. The fact is, that there is no nominative whatever to the verb in the Greek, and, if one is necessary, it must be sought and supplied. What is it which is sown? Seed. Then why not supply "seed," which is a term which the apostle was accustomed to use for human life? We then reach a meaning which is consistent throughout. God sows like seed the principle of man's life as natural body, that in death it may be quickened and raised as spiritual body. In this life we are in bodies of which the char-

acteristics are, corruption or decay, dishonour or unseemliness, weakness or want of endurance, and soulishness or sense feeling and thought. Out of this those who are in Christ are rising with Him into a new order of life, upon which they enter at death, both spirit and body. The natural body is changed into spiritual body ; only its outer shell, representing the old man, is left behind to be dissolved. This appears to me to be the teaching of S. Paul.

He adds, "If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body." This I take to be a general statement, and I think it would be better to omit the article—"If there is natural body, there is also spiritual body." The natural or soulish body we know as the organ of soul-life ; the spiritual body will be the organ of spirit-life. Each has its organ ; and an interesting question arises here. Is not the organism of the spirit-life already formed in those who are "risen with Christ" ? Does not the Spirit of God in this sense "quicken also" our "mortal bodies" ? (Rom. viii. 11). This would be in agreement with what we have seen, that the spiritual body is the rising up of the

natural body. On this ground, I think we can safely say, that a substance can be the same and yet different. For the discussion of the transmutation of substance, I refer the reader to the essay "Corpus Christi."

We come now to the consideration of "the general resurrection." Although this phrase occurs in the office for the Burial of the Dead, we may not infer that our Church makes a distinction between it and the rising of the individual, as is done in this essay. But the distinction is helpful, and answers to what we observe in Holy Scripture. The phrase usually employed for the general resurrection is "the resurrection of the dead," which means a rising of dead *persons*, not of dead *bodies*. Those whom we speak of as "the dead" are only dead to us, for all live unto God. They live in the entirety of their being, spirit and body. Their rising is, therefore, *relative to us*. It is not necessary to argue the point, but it is necessary to emphasise it. The manifestation of the dead to us is their resurrection from the dead.

Some attention must be given to their present "place" of abode before we consider their resurrection. And a brief notice of some of the

Rabbinical ideas will prepare us to understand the teaching of the New Testament. Sheol, the place of the dead, was usually located under the earth, but Paradise, the abode of the righteous, was held by some of the Rabbis to be elsewhere. "Taking the (Rabbinical) literature as it is, it might appear that Paradise was regarded by some as on earth itself, by others as forming part of Sheol, by others still as neither on earth nor under earth, but in heaven; while some also held that there were two Paradises—one in heaven, for those who are perfect in holiness, and one on earth, for those who come short of that" (under "Paradise" in Hastings' "Dict. of the Bible"). The following passage from the Talmud, quoted by Alger ("Doc. of the Future Life," p. 169), contains what was probably the common notion: "After this the Messiah, the son of David, came to the gates of the *under-world*. But when the bound, who are in Gehenna, saw the light of the Messiah, they began rejoicing to receive Him, saying, He shall lead us *up* from this darkness." "The captives shall *ascend from the under-world*, Shechinah at their head." According to this idea, the coming forth of the dead into manifested life would be viewed as a

rising up, without any reference necessarily to the buried body, though it was generally included under the Jewish notion of resurrection. So general was the idea of the place of the dead being under the earth, that to express the fact that Christ was united with the dead in His death, it was necessary to say "He *descended* into hell." No other expression could have conveyed what was meant.

The general prevalence of these ideas when Christianity came into the world had a large influence upon its terminology, even when its thought took a higher line. The higher thought of every age is under the necessity of clothing itself in the old terms, but it does not leave them as it found them : it glorifies them by a sort of resurrection. But the new faith did not utterly discard the old : it retained what was in accord with itself, even though it did not altogether rise to its level. Identity of language is not always identity of thought.

Our Lord and the New Testament writers adopt many of the terms in common use among their contemporaries in dealing with the matters under consideration, but we are justified in interpreting them in harmony with their general

system of thought. They also follow on some points the old theology, and we infer that in such points it was true, and in all probability contained deeper truth than had been seen in it by its first teachers. Our Lord and His disciples believed in Paradise, but there is no intimation of its locality. They speak of the *rising up* of the dead, as if they were in the grave or in an under-world ; and they spoke of them as in the grave, not understanding that they were ; and they were content to think of the dead, possibly, as under the earth. But there is one statement which we shall have to notice which suggests another view.

Although the re-appearance of the dead is spoken of as a rising up or being raised, it does not appear that the New Testament ever teaches the rising again of the *dead bodies* at the general resurrection. We have seen that it does not enter into S. Paul's doctrine, and that, as a matter of fact, the body really ceases to exist by its dissolution ; and yet there will be a notion lingering in some minds, that the resurrection of the dead body must be taught somewhere in the New Testament, or how has it come to be so generally believed ? The employment of the

term "resurrection" to the cases in which the dead body was actually raised, the raising of the widow's son, of Lazarus and of our Lord, suggests to some the idea that the rising of the dead body is also implied in all other cases of "resurrection." But in those cases the bodies were still in existence, they had not been dissolved. Then, we have the account of the appearance of the departed saints after Christ had yielded up His spirit, recorded in S. Matthew: "And the tombs were opened ; and many bodies of the saints that had fallen asleep were raised ; and coming forth out of the tombs after his resurrection, they entered into the holy city, and appeared unto many" (chap. xxvii. 52, 53). This phenomenon is in the narrative placed in connection with our Lord's death, and it is not at all surprising that that event should have an effect, not only on nature, but should reach to the world of spirits. But we cannot pass over the seeming inconsistency that the appearances in the city were "after his resurrection." We may suppose that there were other appearances before those in the city, or that the narrative is not in its proper connection. In short, there is no reason to discredit the experience contained

in the narrative, but that does not involve the literal truth of every particular in the statement of it. The evangelist simply reports what had been reported to him ; and it is not evident whether he or his informers give the shape to the account, nor is it material. The phenomenon itself was, that persons from the dead were seen with their bodies. This is told as if the dead persons had come out of the tombs, but the people who tell it *did not believe the dead were in the tombs* : they believed the departed saints were in Paradise. They may have thought their bodies had come from the tombs, or they may only have used the common form of speech, as when we say the sun rises. And if they believed that the bodies of the risen persons were those which had lain in their tombs, that is only their explanation of the experience. We may accept the latter without being bound to the former, since the truth of the experience would not be impaired by the rejection of an explanation for which there is no support. The dead appeared with their bodies ; that is all the narrative proves.

The only really "strong" point in support of the rising of the dead bodies at the general

resurrection is the statement of Christ—"The hour cometh, in which all that are in the tombs shall hear his voice, and shall come forth" (S. John v. 28, 29). We shall all give to this a value which we could not to the opinion of an evangelist even. It is simply a question of what our Lord meant. Did He mean that the dead "*are* in the tombs"? The Jewish Rabbis did not, though they used this form of expression. And neither did He; for He taught that the patriarchs are alive (S. Luke xx. 38), and to the dying thief He said, "To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." Evidently Christ did not mean that "they," the persons, were "in the tombs." Then why use the phrase? Because it was the common speech, and would convey to the hearers just that which He intended better than any other language—that all those who, in the language of the time, were in the grave would live in the completeness of their being at the last day. I cannot see how He could have better conveyed His meaning without confusing the minds of His hearers with questions which were not then before Him or them.

The conclusion to which we come is, that

there is no foundation in the New Testament for the application of the term "resurrection" to a rising again of the dead body. The term applies to the "rising up" of the dead with their bodies which they now have. The general belief was, that the "dead" were alive; and what S. Peter says of Christ going to preach to the dead confirms that belief (see 1 Peter iii. 18-20, and iv. 6, and compare with Rabbinical teaching, p. 71). And, since the general idea was that Sheol, or Hades, or the place of the dead, was underneath the earth, the use of the expression "rising up" or "resurrection" has reference to that idea, as if the dead came from the under-world. But we have seen that Paradise was believed by some to be *above*, in the heavens. If, as is probable, they used the term "resurrection" for a general rising, then it would mean, not a "rising up," but *a coming down*. S. Paul was one of those who believed that Paradise was above—"And I knew such a man . . . how that he was caught up into Paradise" (2 Cor. xii. 3, 4). He believed that the Lord was above, and would "descend from heaven" at His appearing, coming through Paradise, we may infer. He also believed that

departure from this life meant "to be at home with the Lord"—that is, in Paradise above. Add to this, what we have already proved, that he believed the departed "have" their spiritual bodies "in the heavens" (2 Cor. v.), and we are in a position to understand what he says to the Thessalonians upon the "resurrection" of the dead at the Advent.

The first point to notice is "the coming of our Lord Jesus *with* all his saints" (1 Thess. iii. 13). With this compare the following: "Them also that sleep in Jesus will God bring *with* him" (chap. iv. 14); "The revelation of the Lord Jesus from heaven *with* the angels of his power" (2 Thess. i. 7); and, "And all the angels *with* him" (Matt. xxv. 31). These all evidently refer to the same event, though there may be a distinction between the saints and the angels. Personally, for reasons too long to give here, I hold that the saints are angels. But, in any case, the angels *descend* with the Lord, and it seems to be implied that the saints also descend with them. This is borne out by S. Paul's ideas of Paradise, given above. What more he says to the Thessalonians upon this matter falls into harmony with this, if we allow for the

exigencies of speech. In chapter iv. of the first epistle, having said that the blessed dead will come "with him," he says the Lord will descend "from heaven" (ver. 16), but apparently not to the earth. He then states that "the dead in Christ rise first"—that is, before they are joined by them "that are alive." These latter, being changed, join the others, and in one body they ascend to the Lord "in the air" (vers. 16, 17). The point to notice is, that the revelation of the departed is consequent upon the revelation of the Lord: the Lord reveals Himself, and that reveals the departed who are "with him." But this revelation of the dead is spoken of by S. Paul as a rising. It will be a rising relative to those who are alive and remain, and that is the point of view from which the apostle describes the event. Although he believed the saints were in Paradise above, he uses the term which meant a "rising up" for what he conceived to be a revelation from above, because it was the common speech of the time.

The statement concerning the general resurrection in 1 Cor. xv. 52 must be read in connection with, and in the sense of, the

above—"The dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed." The "we" here are "those that are alive, that are left." Upon them a change takes place by which they enter into the same state as the departed: their natural bodies are changed into spiritual bodies. This is that they may "meet the Lord *in the air*"—that is, in the spirit-world. "The prince of *the power of the air*" (Eph. ii. 2) designates a power of the spirit-world. And the revelation of the Lord will "transfigure" His people who "are alive." This will be their "resurrection," so to speak.

There is, it will be observed, a very close connection between the Parousia and the general resurrection; and the connection is not merely that of coincidence, nor of sequence, but of consequence. The former is the cause of the latter. The reality of spirit as a force having in it the basis of all kinds of being, is only beginning to be realised. Christ is the personal Medium of that force, as His history is intended to testify. Being spirit, it works within, and, by infusing itself into creature spirits, it takes hold of and moulds body. "The grace that is to be brought . . . at the

revelation of Jesus Christ " (1 Pet. i. 13), is but one aspect of this power. It is the power of the Holy Spirit, "the Lord and Giver of Life." The Parousia will thus be accompanied with a large accession of Life, quickening latent powers of the spirit, and bringing forth new qualities of the body. The whole order of nature will be carried up into the conditions of a spiritual world, where all phenomena are the manifestation of spiritual states and relations. A necessary result will be the opening of the spiritual perceptions, so that the dead will be seen in their spiritual bodies, as if they had come from their graves, the veil of sense-life vanishing as a dream, for ever. Then shall we see the Lord "as he is," in glory of form because of the truth of inward perception and fellowship. Then will come to His own that which they could not receive until filled to the full with His fulness, the glorification of their bodies: "We wait for a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ: who shall fashion anew the body of our humiliation, that it may be conformed to the body of his glory" (Phil. iii. 20, 21). Somewhat of glory will belong to the bodies of the saints on their entrance into

82 RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD

Paradise, and this will grow with the growth of their life ; but only the coming of the Lord will give perfect glory, because only thereby will the spiritual life be perfected. Then we, with all those that are departed in the true faith of His holy Name, shall have our perfect consummation and bliss both in body and soul in His eternal and everlasting glory.

DIVINE FORE-KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM

BISHOP GORE, in his "Ephesians," says, "Beyond all question there is one problem which remains unsolved and insoluble—the relation of divine fore-knowledge to human freedom." The unsolved may present such difficulties as to appear to justify the assertion that it is insoluble; and the mere assumption that in such a case a solution is *possible* may have the semblance of presumption, attributing to the human intellect unwarrantable powers. But it should be observed that the affirmation that a problem is insoluble is itself one of two unwarrantable assumptions. Either it is assumed that the entire capabilities of the human mind have been measured and are known—a matter which cannot be known without superhuman knowledge—or, that the possibilities of the case are so completely known that it can

be affirmed that the elements in it are essentially, of their very nature, contradictory.

With regard to the former—the possibilities of the human understanding—our present attainments are no certain measure of what is possible ; and the limit which we have reached cannot be affirmed to be the final limit, unless we know more than we know. Indeed, it is not possible to say just where the limitation of the human intellect comes in. It may not be the same in all cases ; indeed it is not the same. Some would affirm, with Dean Mansell, that the human mind cannot know God ; and others that it can have no knowledge except that which is derived from sense-perception. Each of these may be true of certain types of mind, but they may be equally untrue of another type. That the ordinary mind has not explicitly the gift of the seer or of the prophet is no more evidence that the human mind cannot possess such powers, than is the absence of the poetic gift in many persons evidence that there is no such faculty in man. Some limit to the human understanding may be assumed, but the point of it cannot be demonstrated. And, if a limit

could be demonstrated to the intellect of man acting of itself, there would still be the possibility of that supernatural enlightenment which has been the common faith of mankind, and which we believe is realised in the gift of the Holy Spirit, by which the intellectual faculties are raised to a high degree of perception. The limit, if any, may be conditional and not absolute. This, however, may be safely affirmed,—that whatever limitation there is, it does not apply to matters which are of the substance of revelation and of practical value in the regulation of conduct. Divine fore-knowledge and human freedom belong to both these categories.

If the insolubility of the problem cannot be maintained on the ground of the known limits of the human understanding, neither can it be because the two sides are so well perceived that they are known to be essentially inconsistent. Indeed, those who hold to both Divine fore-knowledge and human freedom believe that they are in perfect agreement. This is a necessity of thought, because they are both parts of truth, of the reality of things; and truth must form a perfect whole. Somewhere

this perfect harmony must be viewed in idea : the Divine thought must contain it in the conception of which it is the actuality. There is not, then, anything in the actual facts of Divine fore-knowledge and human freedom which absolutely excludes them from being combined in thought. After all it is a question, not of a known contradictoriness of the two concepts, but whether man has the capacity to take in the concepts in their concord. If, however, the "all truth" is opened to the human mind under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, it may be believed that this and many other supposed insoluble problems are open to the vision of man's mind, if it is sustained in its look and attention by holy energy.

But are we justified in seeking an intellectual conception of the concord of truths which, though matters of revelation, bear the marks of "mysteries." Ought not faith to implicitly accept the irreconcilable things of revelation? Yes, most certainly; faith ought to accept *anything* which is given by revelation from God, however impossible it may appear. But it is a pernicious and dangerous supposition that there is a virtue in believing a thing *because* it

presents intellectual difficulties, is a "mystery"—a most abused and misunderstood term—which ought not to be inquired into, and that a matter ceases to be a thing of faith as soon as it becomes a thing of the understanding. A fuller knowledge and a deeper insight, instead of doing away with faith, furnishes a broader basis upon which a larger faith can be erected. For all faith is intended to lead to a larger knowledge, and all knowledge to a larger faith.

The reconciliation of the two apparently contradictory elements of our problem will save us from two dangers which are present so long as they are not seen in concord. There is a danger of looking at one or the other too exclusively—either at the fact of human freedom or at Divine fore-knowledge and its allied truth, fore-ordination. The moral life of man needs the sense of freedom to nourish and invigorate the sense of responsibility, and to stimulate to right endeavour. But the exclusive contemplation of human freedom is calculated to induce the notion that human life is an utter chaos—an unordered, disconnected, confused heap of issues produced by many independent wills. As a corrective to this, there is need of

the conception of the Divine mind knowing and co-ordinating all beforehand, in order to give an assurance that creature free-action can never outrun Divine Providence—prevision and provision. Faith in God and in His effective oversight is the only solid ground for right action and patient suffering. If we look only at man's freedom, we are apt to become pessimistic ; and if only at Divine fore-knowledge, as it is commonly understood, we are liable to attribute to God, and account Him responsible for, things which do not and cannot come from Him. So long as we are liable to be swayed by one or other of these two notions, we cannot render our moral attitude in all respects as safe as it should be. Any one who is accustomed to observe the movements of his own heart will know the truth of the above. Our subject is thus of practical and not merely of speculative interest, like many other matters which are too apt to be regarded as problems for the curious only.

When two ideas, both of which are true, create in the mind the sense of incongruity or discord, it is because there is an imperfect perception of one or of both of them. In the

problem before us, though human freedom is itself disputed, the essential meaning of the term is not ; whereas Divine fore-knowledge is admittedly, and of necessity, a much more difficult thing upon which to form a clear idea. We may, therefore, expect to find the cause of the incongruity of our thoughts in an imperfect knowledge of the meaning of fore-knowledge in God.

There are necessary depths in the Divine Being which are not fathomed either by revelation or reason, nor can be by both combined. Nevertheless, there is much which, on the grounds of revelation and the necessary laws of thought, we can confidently affirm to be true, or not true, of Him. For example : He is all which He is before and independently of His creation and His creatures—all perfect, and neither needing nor receiving aught from without. Experience can add nothing to the development of His life, to the growth of His wisdom, to the development of His knowledge. The modern "God" is a new invention, and more like the gods of the nations than the true Jahveh of Israel. Experience, as we know and understand it, *is impossible to the perfect Being.*

In this lies the ground for a characteristic of Divine knowledge which distinguishes it necessarily and absolutely from human knowledge. Human knowledge is based upon experience ; Divine knowledge is not.

All human knowledge is based upon experience of some kind—physical, moral, or spiritual ; and is consequently dependent upon fact and subsequent to it. Even such fore-knowledge as man may attain, is dependent upon facts which have occurred. It is implicitly inferred from this that knowledge is always caused, and is constituted knowledge, by the facts occurring ; that knowledge is either the memory of what has emerged as fact, or the prevision of that which is certain to become fact. This derivation of knowledge from fact is not a necessary attribute of all knowledge. We may know of two things either of which may come to pass ; the one does, the other does not, but both possibilities were known. Fore-knowledge is knowledge *before* the fact. And in that case the particular knowledge is not caused by that particular fact, but by something prior to it. The knowledge, as knowledge, is separated

from the fact and exists in the idea. And the one essential of knowledge is an idea accurately corresponding with the fact, whether the fact precedes or is subsequent to the idea.

God's knowledge, not being acquired by experience, not being caused or occasioned by the occurrence of events, exists before the facts, before any facts outside Himself. Every tree of the garden of Eden was existent in the Divine mind before it was in the earth, and so also every idea of every other thing created. These ideas are not developed any more than they are acquired ; *they are*. And they are as full, perfect, and accurate in all respects as if derived from the things which they image. It is real knowledge, though not a knowledge of the real. No object in nature or art, no experience or attainment in human life, nothing, whether good or evil, becomes existent in the order of things but it was existent always in the Divine mind in the most accurate, the all-accurate, conception. The existence of these ideas is quite independent of things themselves : that the things have occurred or will occur adds

nothing to them. The ideas are not there because they will or may occur ; and their being there does not make it necessary that they should, at some time, be realised as things. Indeed, God knows many things which will never become fact. He knows what an unjust God would be like, but it will never become a fact. He has the entire knowledge of things which will never be realised. And so, we are in a position to affirm that the knowledge of God includes ideas which do not become realised as well as those that do. And this brings us to the true sense of Omniscience. It is All-knowledge : knowledge which covers that which may be and that which cannot be, that which will be and that which will not be, and quite apart from, and without any distinction caused by, their being or not being. Indeed, all ideas are equally and eternally present to the Divine mind. To be in Himself the perfect God of which He has given us the idea, He must know evil as well as He knows good, and that which He bars out of His work equally with that which He incorporates into it.

It is this perfect possession of all ideas which constitutes the basis of the wisdom, the practical oversight, of God. Divine providence, or fore-sight, arranges for all exigencies, for every possible development of events. The Divine ideas are all-inclusive, and for them all, without exception, arrangements are made. Some are barred out altogether, some are predetermined that they shall be, others are left entirely to the free determination of responsible creatures. But the uncertainty involved in free action is provided for by alternatives, so that there are always resources to meet, and where necessary to amend, the issues of a misuse of freedom. Hence we have predetermination, or a *marking out of boundaries beforehand*, and predestination, or the prior determination of the end at which a thing or a person shall arrive on or without an exercise of freedom. For the endowment of man with freedom is as much a matter of predetermination as would be the absence of it. It is not necessary to the solution of our problem to discuss the extent and matters of predetermination and predestination further than to observe that, while fore-knowledge is

all-inclusive, their range is limited ; that predetermination provides for freedom and its limits ; and that predestination, which may make some things absolute, leaves others dependent upon conditions. God not only endows man with freedom, but He preserves a real and necessary freedom for Himself.

It has been suggested to me that, by saying that some things are predetermined, I imply a something, a substance or department of being, which has or acquires a quasi-independence of the free mind of God. I think not, though I cannot now fully discuss this point. It has, in other connections, been before me ; but I will only say, in a figurative way, that God may be viewed as holding some things firm with His left hand while He works freely with His right hand, but there is nothing to hinder Him from moving with His left, if the working of His and human freedom make that desirable. He may yet alter all that we know as the "fixed" laws of nature, but He will not alter the determinations which make up His will.

From what has been said above, it will be seen that Divine fore-knowledge neither depends upon facts which are future, nor renders it

necessary that the ideas which constitute that knowledge shall become facts at some future time. The infinitude of God involves the existence in Him of more than is realisable in a finite creation, of ideas which He may not carry into effect; and hence a freedom in Him by which He selects and chooses from varying possibilities. For example, it is necessary for us to believe in regard to God, as well as in man, that

“The quality of mercy is not strain’d,”

but that it is a free expression of the Divine will. And, since there is thus no necessity because an idea exists in the Divine mind that it should emerge and become fact, there is nothing in the ideas which God has concerning humanity which makes their realisation certain. Indeed He may have simultaneously more than one conception of man, and these may be so unlike as to be impossible of being both realised. Some such contrasted ideas He must have, each equally clear, or He would not know all that man might be. He must have had as full a knowledge of humanity unfallen and sinless as of humanity fallen and sinful. Now

the existence of the one idea is no more, as an idea alone, apt to become a fact than is the other. The fact cannot exist without the idea, but the idea alone will not make the fact. This is a truth of supreme importance, not only in its bearing upon the matter in hand, but because it touches many other questions concerning the Divine Being. It is worth while to be at some trouble to be quite clear and assured on this point. It is easy to assent to it, and then to let it slip just when it is wanted. If the mere presence of an idea in the mind of God is a reason for it coming to pass, then the ideas of evil and sin in the Divine mind produce these, and He is the Author of evil! And if He has the ideas of good and evil, then He produces good and evil and all the consequent strife! No idea in God can become fact until either He or some creature endowed with freedom *wills it*.

We have seen from our examination of Divine fore-knowledge, that human action does not determine or contribute anything to the ideas which it contains. We now see also that human action is not determined by God's fore-knowledge. We thus arrive at the conclusion

that God's fore-knowledge and human action, where freedom exists, are quite independent of each other. There is no causal connection between them one way or the other. It is the supposition, definite or vague, of such a connection on one side or the other which has been the chief cause of the difficulty. Once get quite clear of that, and we are near a true solution of our problem.

But we must now turn our attention to human freedom. The problem before us assumes that man has the power of free-determination, or self-determination, or will ; and we shall do the same. For our present purpose it is not necessary to discuss its limitations, nor the conditions under which it comes into play. It is enough that it exist in some degree, and in a measure to constitute man morally responsible. In passing it may, however, be observed, that the power to will and the power to work are not identical, and that the absence of the latter does not exclude the former.

Freedom, or will, is the power to choose between two alternatives, to select one thing in preference to another, to direct effort by self-determination in one direction rather than in

another, without any power, or motive, or circumstance having the force to control the state of mind which is the essence of choice or will. A "will" determined by anything not itself is not will. It must be able to initiate. Indeed, wherever the creature is invested with freedom he shares in the power of the Creator—he can originate something. But he cannot originate anything which had not in idea previously existed in the Divine mind. His inventions, his wisdom, his noble thoughts, his nobler deeds, his feelings and passions, his loathsome vices, his horrible crimes, were all first in the mind of God, before they were in the mind of any creature. A shallow sentimentalism may be shocked at this portraiture of the contents of the mind of our God. It may be well, if such an earthquake only awakens some attention to the logic of truth. It is well for us, it is well for all, that all this has been thought of before by the One upon whom rests the final responsibility for the plan of things which includes freedom in the creature.

The ideas of what man may be by his own free action do not possess any moral quality in the Divine mind: they are neither good nor

evil, though they concern things which will be good and evil, will receive a moral quality, when chosen and willed by man. It may be repeated again, that the existence of the idea does not make the realisation of it in fact a necessity. This can come to pass solely by the creature's free-determination. It is the infusion of will into the ideas which imparts the moral quality.

A concrete case will, I think, help to make the above positions clear. Let us take the case of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, the darkest deed ever done. The idea of it existed perfectly in the mind of God from the beginning, and alongside it also the equally vivid idea of Him received in faith and love and obedience. The two alternatives are equally foreknown, and there is no reason in the mere ideas themselves why the one should become a fact and not the other. If God wills that one shall become fact and not the other, then human freedom is excluded. But it was not excluded—the crucifixion of the Son of God was man's free act. The two alternatives which were before God were before him, and both were possible, in the fullest sense that term can hold. Man's will worked out the alternative which he chose, but

it had been before in the fore-knowledge of God, but that did not make it inevitable, for the contrary idea was also there.

I am well aware that the above statements go right to the heart of the question of the Atonement, but that I shall deal with in a separate paper. Indeed, that is only one out of many theological questions which are involved in, and affected by, the position taken in this essay.

Since, then, all ideas are within the Divine fore-knowledge, whatever the human will determines and effects is foreknown and preconceived. It is not, however, foreknown that it will be ; for that which is depending upon free choice, will, cannot be sure to happen until the will has determined that it shall happen. This may appear to place a limit on the knowledge of God out of harmony with His perfection. But a contradiction of any kind in God would be an imperfection, and certainly to know that a thing would happen when it was yet uncertain whether it would happen would be a contradiction, and a contradiction which would reach further than itself. No ; it must be maintained and stated with all possible emphasis, that God does not know beforehand the particular choice that a

free agent will make nor the line of conduct which he will follow. God did not know beforehand that Adam would sin ; nor that men would crucify His Son, until the determination had been arrived at by the creature. "They will reverence my son" had its correspondent in the mind of God. There is a great need here of that observance of differences which is essential to right thinking, in order to perceive that it is one thing to have a true idea of an event before it happens and another to know that it will happen.

Now whatever man may choose to perform, whichever of two or more alternatives he may elect, it can never be anything outside the Divine forethought ; it may be new as an act without being so as a concept, for its precise counterpart in idea has always been present to the mind of God. And if the choice had been something entirely different, it too would also have had prior existence among the all-ideas of God. Conceive of man endowed with the greatest variety of powers, and with the utmost freedom, and think of him moving in a sphere cut off absolutely from any kind of connection with God, yet everything, to the minutest par-

ticular, would be present in the Divine mind. And it is on account of these complete and self-existent all-ideas, that as man, in his freedom, takes this or that course, he can only do what has a place in Divine fore-knowledge.

The history of humanity in its moral wanderings presents the outcome of the use or misuse of freedom, and it was all foreknown. If man had elected, as he had the power to do, to work out a course wholly different from that which history records if he had continued sinless and in conscious fellowship with God, although another history and a totally different evolution of things would have been the result, yet *it* would only have been a realisation of what was foreknown. *Both that which is and that which ought to have been but is not, were equally fore-known, and either according to God's fore-knowledge.*

I think we have reached a conclusion which solves our problem. It is possible in this way to see the perfect concord between the Divine fore-knowledge and human freedom. They do not interfere with each other, and while the former leaves the latter intact, it is a guarantee that human action is always provided for in the counsel of God, and that He cannot be charged

with complicity with the sins of men *because He knew what they would do*. We have come near to the question of the origin of evil, and those who can read between the lines may find the solution I should offer, which, I think, should go far towards placing beyond all doubt the solution of the difficulty we have been considering.

The view of God's fore-knowledge which is given above, seems to leave out any knowledge on His part of anything which occurs in the domain of fact, and to render it unnecessary. To suppose God is without any conscious relation to the facts of creation and of human life and history would run counter to the whole tenor of revelation, which implies and teaches that there is a real and intimate knowledge in God of the things actually occurring in the world. At first it will seem as if there could be no distinction even in God between the perfect idea before the fact and the full knowledge of the fact which has occurred. Both being perfect, in the same consciousness they would coincide in every particular and would make but one concept, and so be indistinguishable. But there must be a knowledge

of fact in the Deity as distinguished from the all-ideas: He must know what is as well as what is not, and with a difference. This seems to be possible only when the two sets or departments of knowledge are held apart and not allowed to coalesce. This, since it would be continuous in God, in whom there is no forgetting, would be more than our distinguishing successive states of mind. For these two sets of knowledge to be perfect, as everything must be in God, it would seem that there is in Him that which we can only define as two separate consciousnesses. We thus come upon the question of distinct "Persons" within the Godhead—as we always do when we think deeply upon Him—for personality consists of consciousness, and separate consciousness is separate personality. Three Persons in One God is three consciousnesses within the Godhead. (See "Stones from the Quarry," on "The Holy Trinity.") I will state briefly what I hope at some future time to deal with more fully—

- (1) The Person of the Father contains the consciousness of the all-ideas ;
- (2) the Person of the Son contains the consciousness of all which is, both in the Father and in creation, and all

which is implied therein ; (3) the Person of the Holy Spirit contains, and is, the consciousness working from that which is to that which ought to be. This necessarily imperfect statement of what I hold to be a fundamental and necessary distinction in the Godhead is introduced here only for the purpose of meeting a possible objection to my theory of Divine knowledge, and I venture to think that the way in which it fits in with the fact of the Holy Trinity is another point in support of it.

That the Son is that Personality of the Deity which is in relation to fact as such, is in accord with His mediatorship in creation, in redemption, in judgment, and in the kingdom. It seems from the gospel narratives that He is God in relation to that which is, and that in Him the facts in God and man meet in a common consciousness. This view of the Son as the Divine in conscious relation to fact, no doubt bears upon the question of limitation in the human knowledge of Christ, which lies outside our subject. But there is another question which comes within it with which we must deal briefly ; namely, the possibility and nature of "prophecy."

The theory of knowledge in God which has been presented, if it does not exclude prophecy in the sense of foretelling, will very materially modify it. The idea has generally been held, that God could by His prophet foretell any event, because by His omniscience He knows beforehand everything which will be done, and all which can happen. The omniscience of God being, as we have seen, the sum of all ideas independently of their occurring, it is not necessary to suppose that He must foresee the events themselves or not be omniscient. We can say, He is omniscient, and yet does not know that which will be done in the future where man's freedom comes in. He cannot foresee that which is uncertain, and He cannot even see beforehand the particular thing *He* will do in cases where His action will be dependent upon the action of a free agent. There is no necessity that He should. But this does not exclude all prevision and predeclaration of the future, seeing that by far the larger part of the order of Providence lies outside human and all creature freedom ; and even where that freedom comes in, it has not full command of the issues of its own

choice, these, as effects, being linked by a Divine decree to the things chosen. A closer study of the place of freedom in the plan of Providence will save from the exaggerated notion of vaticination, which cannot be supported either by reason or revelation ; and also correct the present tendency to get rid of it, as far as possible, both from the Old and the New Testament. I think that the teaching of this paper saves us from both extremes, which gives further support to the theory of God's fore-knowledge which it sets forth.

Without entering into particulars, the general principles which follow from that theory may be stated :—(1) It is clear that, if God resolves to accomplish and fulfil any of the ideas which exist in Him, that may be foretold if He communicates it to His prophet. (2) If the conditions of things are at any time such that by reason of the law of cause and effect, or, which is the same thing, by reason of Divine predetermination of the issues of the prior states, a result, or results, follow—unless some action of God or of man can and does modify the conditions—then, this also may be foretold. (3) But if there are, as there are, matters which

will have to be determined by creature free-action, then these things cannot possibly be foretold. Nothing can be foretold the conditions and causes of which are not at the time in existence. (4) Although the particular event in such cases cannot be predeclared, it may be presented as certain to come to pass when these conditions are in the prophet's mind viewed as already existent. (5) There may be two alternative issues set forth in prophecy, either of which may come to pass, or both under differing circumstances and at different times.

Prophecy which concerns matters included in, or affected by, human freedom is always conditional, even when there is no condition expressed. And consequently, *it may not be fulfilled*, as in the case of Nineveh—"Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown." There are two distinct lines of prophecy concerning the Messiah, the ruling King and the suffering Servant of the Lord. Both were possibilities, and both were presented to the world in the coming of Jesus Christ. He might wear a crown or bear the cross. He was equal to either. Which it should be, the attitude and action of men as free agents would decide.

They did decide it, "they crucified him," and thereby did the darkest and most disastrous deed the world has ever known—though grace will conquer yet, and by the cross. It is writ large in the Gospels, that Jesus Christ attributed to men a free, and, therefore, not inevitable, frustration of the desire of His heart,—to establish the kingdom of God.

Not until we see the Divine Fore-knowledge and Human Freedom in their true relation to each other shall we learn to look in the proper quarter for man's advancement—the right use of human will.

THE ATONEMENT

THE existence and sense of sin, involving an estrangement between God and man, raises a problem deep and difficult ; not only difficult of solution from the human point of view, but, if anything can be difficult to Deity, also the most perplexing and most arduous from the Divine side. That that problem is met and solved practically and consistently in the person and mission of Christ is an essential element in the Christian Faith ; and the solution is rightly attributed to the offering which He made of Himself on the cross. But while this is accepted as beyond all question, yet there have been various ways of interpreting this rectification of the relation of God and man and the consequent attainment of salvation for man. The cross and passion of our Lord has been viewed as a satisfaction rendered, or *in appearance* given, to Satan, to induce him to liberate sinners ; or, it was the pay-

ment to God of a debt incurred by man's want of obedience; or, the suffering of the penalty of sin by the Son of God in the stead of the transgressor; or, the satisfaction of Divine justice and a substitution for the exercise of the just wrath of God, the merit of Christ being reckoned to the sinner who believes; or, a gracious means by which God reveals His fatherly love as both just in the condemnation of sin and merciful in the remission of it; or, yet again, as an act of such vital and illustrious righteousness that it contains the virtue of restoring man morally, reconciling him to God and, in a sense, God to him. And the place which each of these modes of stating the remedy, or atonement, for sin has held in the faith of Christians at different times, entitles them all to a favourable judgment in this measure, that they have each enabled those holding them to come into relation to some great fact which is, whether rightly interpreted by them or not, the atonement for sin. For an imperfect faith may involve a relation to a reality which far transcends it. Indeed, the ἀλήθεια must always transcend the δόξα.

And this leads me to observe, that in the New Testament itself diversities of doctrine on this subject may be noted. I have some recollection of seeing, many years ago, a work bearing some such title as "The Atonement as taught by Christ Himself." It thus suggested a difference between the teaching of Christ and of the epistles, and, I think, even a contradiction of doctrine was maintained. But while rejecting the possibility of contradiction, I think we must admit of diversity; not only between the gospels and the epistles, but also between the epistles themselves. S. Paul in the Galatians and the Romans differs from S. John in his first epistle. The former makes the death and sacrifice of Christ the means or place of atonement—"in his blood ;" the latter the person and character of Christ—" *He* is the propitiation for our sins"—"Jesus Christ the righteous." And, again, while there is a marked similarity between the teaching of the Romans and the Hebrews, there is a very important difference. S. Paul teaches that "we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son"; the writer of the Hebrews, that Christ's entrance into the Holy Place,

through and with His blood, is the climax of atonement. These differences are not contradictions; they shade off one into the other as the colours of the rainbow, and are only broken lights of the larger truth. All this suggests, that the fact with which we have to deal is one which cannot be exhaustively stated in any one form. Indeed, it suggests that the atonement might be effected in different ways.

Could it possibly have taken another form from that which it did? The question is necessary, if we would arrive at a true estimate of that which has been done. The atonement *was* effected by the death and sacrifice of Christ; that is beyond all question. But we read of "the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world," and a propitiation "for the sins of *the whole world*," which introduces the idea of an atonement which is fundamental to the Divine constitution of things and is effectual universally, not only for the human race but for all sinners. Ignatius in his epistle *To the Smyrnæans*, chap. vi., says: "Both the things which are in heaven, and *the glorious angels*, and rulers, both visible and

invisible, if they believe not in the blood of Christ, shall, in consequence, incur condemnation. 'He that is able to receive it, let him receive it.'" And Origen, in bk. viii. chap. lix., *Against Celsus*, after quoting Phil. ii. 10, 11, says: "The almighty, living, self-revealing God, who has manifested Himself by Him who by His great power has spread the true principles of holiness among all men throughout the world; yea, I may add without exaggeration, He has given this knowledge to all beings everywhere possessed of reason, and needing deliverance from the plague and corruption of sin." I give these quotations from the Fathers to show that it is no new conception that there is an eternal and universal remedy for sin—an atonement in worlds where Christ has not been crucified. And I would suggest, that a distinction must be observed between the atonement intrinsically and the atonement historically; between what it is in the eternal and fundamental order of things, and that particular form of it which meets the circumstances under which Christ died for us.

In examining this subject we must give primary and pre-eminent importance to Re-

velation, and to Revelation as embodied in the historical atonement. And the historical atonement includes not only the fact of our Lord's endurance of sin, but also the effect of this upon the minds of those who gave themselves to Him in faith. The statements of the New Testament writers on this subject must be interpreted as consequent upon their personal experience. They taught a doctrine concerning the death of Christ which was an embodiment of that which they experimentally found in and by His death. And in looking this historical atonement in the face, we must take in all its features and see the parts in the whole. One feature does not make a face; nor does one particular part of the work of atonement constitute the whole. There has been no more fruitful source of misconception than the limitation of the atonement to one set of terms—as sacrifice and propitiation; or to one limited end—as pardon, or justification. The essential nature of the atonement is, as I have suggested, larger than the limits of these sacrificial terms, and has ends of larger import than even the forgiveness of sins and justification from past transgressions.

The term atonement is simple enough,—the reconciliation, or making at one. And yet that carries us but a short distance. It leaves such questions as these:—Is the reconciliation between God and man only, or does it include the reconciliation of man to man and the breaking down of every wall of partition? Does it further include the unification of all things by bringing all under one head in Christ? And, if we limit it to the reconciliation between God and man, are we to understand the reconciliation of God to man; or the reconciliation of man to God? And again, do we mean by “the atonement” the actual fact of such reconciliation, or the means and agency by which that reconciliation is effected? If we understand the former, we may believe in the atonement without being able to assent to a particular explanation of the mode of its accomplishment. And if we designate a certain means as *the* atonement, we must be careful to understand that it is an atonement only in that it effects the reconciliation. I cannot pretend to deal with all these points; but they must all be kept in mind in our consideration of the question before us.

The most important point to which our attention should be given is, *that which renders an atonement necessary*. For, what will constitute an atonement must depend upon the nature of that which occasions it. And that which gives rise to this necessity is *sin*. Sin covers and includes whatsoever is morally amiss, quite irrespective of how it came to be amiss—from wilfulness or weakness, from inheritance or ignorance. The problem is a larger one than that of guilt, and of the penalty which is due to it. Indeed, whereas in most theories of the atonement the question of guilt is the prime difficulty, in both the Old and the New Testament it is sin. Indeed the word “guilt” occurs but twice in the Bible, in Deut. xix. and xxi., and then it is in italics. And more, the idea of guilt as an entity apart from sin, is quite absent from the Scriptures. Guilt is an attribute attaching to wilful sin, the shadow of it, and remains only so long as the substance is there. It is sin which separates God and man.

All Theology is in its ultimate ground the science of God. And if we would know what atonement God requires, we must look into His

face as He has revealed Himself. It is not safe to rest our theory chiefly on what man *feels* He must require ; because the disordered nature of man is almost certain to form false notions of the Divine attitude and demands. Now God, at the first, created man upright, and ordained for him a moral test with the possibility and purpose of his becoming a partaker of His own holiness. This righteousness He desired in each ; not a lump sum of merit, but individual righteousness. That was His first and His final requirement ; and from that He cannot swerve, because He cannot change. The origination of evil by the creature has imported an element which for a time frustrates, but does not change, the primal and enduring purpose of God. The whole difficulty is in this sin. Neither the remission of the penalty, whatever its conditions might be, nor the infliction of it, however severe and long, would in the smallest degree lessen the Divine discontent, or mitigate His wrath, unless the sin itself was removed. There is no substitute with God for individual righteousness.

“This is the will of God, even your sanctification,” lies at the heart of all God’s doings con-

cerning man. As it determined man's creation and probation ; so it is alike the sole end of His mercy and of His wrath against, and severe retribution of, sin. Whatsoever promotes and secures this end is consonant with His nature, satisfies His law, meets His justice, and maintains the honour and integrity of His rule. That which fails of this issue leaves unmitigated the just displeasure of God. And so, if the beloved Son of God bears the sin of the world and presents to His Father the most illustrious obedience and righteousness, all is futile unless the issue is repentance, faith, and moral restoration. The pain and suffering of the sinless Son of God are as ineffective as the eternal agonies of the lost to bring satisfaction to the eternal demand of God, unless there is a moral restoration. On the other hand, if they issue in this result they are, in the truest and fullest sense, a ground of reconciliation. Such an issue would make it consistent to accept the offering of Christ in the stead of punishment, and would make the forgiveness of sins a fuller satisfaction of the Divine discontent than the infliction of sin's penalty.

The means and form of the atonement must

be according to this fundamental requisite of a reconciliation. That which reconciles man to God, reconciles God to man. The introduction of sin effected no change in the Divine nature, and yet it involved a change in God *towards* man. Similarly, no means of atonement changes the nature of God ; but if it brings man into the true relation to Him, then there is also a change in Him *towards* man. And since the atonement in itself is this bringing of God and man into concord, any agency which could remove the cause of estrangement would be an atonement. In this sense the offerings of the Law are spoken of as atonements for sin.

And here it is necessary to observe the sense of the Hebrew term. The substantive in the phrase "day of atonement," or Heb. "day of atonements," כִּפּוּרִים, in Lev. xxiii. 27 and xxv. 9 and elsewhere, is derived from the verb כָּפַר "to cover." Another substantive from the same verb is the name for the mercy-seat כִּפְּתֹרֶת, rendered in Sept., ἱλαστήριον. The verb כָּפַר which means "to cover" is used of covering sin and so "to pardon," and thus comes to mean to make atonement for sin (Lev. v. 18). We find echoes of this sense "to cover" in such phrases

as "charity covereth a multitude of sins," "he that converteth a sinner . . . covereth a multitude of sins." It will be observed that the fundamental idea here is the covering or the blotting-out, the obliterating of the sin. It is covered by ceasing to be visible—passes out of the sphere of that which is ; and any means by which sin is thus obliterated is an atonement in this sense.

That the offerings of the Mosaic economy were real atonements must be admitted, in so far as they took away sin and restored the offerer to a true relationship to God. But of themselves they could never take away sins. It was their effective restoration of the transgressor which constituted their value.

In the same way other means could be an atonement. Primitive sacrifices and the sacramental eating of the animal, or other offerings, in which the Deity was believed to dwell, *if* they gave a new spiritual and moral relation to God, were valid atonements. Again, the suffering servant of the Lord in the Captivity was made "an offering for sin" ; "He bore the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors," because "by his knowledge he

should justify many"—make many righteous, the true sense of the Hebrew. The moral restoration of his people constituted his soul an offering for sin—an atonement. The Psalmist recognises a substitute for sacrifices, another means to their end, in words which, however prophetic they may be, derive their truth from some historic ground :

“Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire ;
Mine ears hast thou opened ;
Burnt-offering and sin-offering
Hast thou not required.
Then said I, Lo, I come ;
In the volume of the book
It is written of me,
I delight to do thy will, O my God ;
Yea, thy law is within my heart.”

—PSALM xl. 6-8.

There is here a clear enunciation of the principle that the purpose of sin-offering is accomplished in a life which is the doing of the will of God from the heart. And whatever was attributed to the atonement of the sin-offering is here attributed to that obedience.

I am aware that it is the custom to regard these as typical and prophetic of the offering of Christ ; and I quite agree with this view. But I would go further, and say, that they are

types only because they have a vital union with that which is the essence of His great atonement ; because they form part of, or are included in, "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." In this way the Psalmist, as the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews teaches, anticipates the atonement by Jesus Christ. And the author of the Hebrews, having applied the Psalmist's words to Christ, significantly adds, "by the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Christ once for all." The sanctification, by the will of God done, *is* the atonement. The manner in which it is effected is by Christ offering Himself ; but the validity lies in its sanctifying efficacy. The obedience of Christ, even unto the death of the cross, made Him effective as an atonement because He thus takes away sin, covers, obliterates it.

But was that particular manner of atonement necessary and essential ? That it *became* necessary by reason of the attitude of men to Christ is certain. But did this necessity exist before the antagonism of the Jews had developed, or was it subsequent ? If it existed before, and was determined upon previous to the ministry

of our Lord, we have some startling consequences to consider. As I heard it baldly stated recently, "Judas *had to* betray the Son of Man." And further, His nation "*had to*" reject the true Messiah; and His murderers "*had to*" imbrue their hands in His blood. I prefer to take the position of the Lord Himself; that all this was quite unnecessary. For, if it were all predetermined, Christ seems to have remained ignorant of it until the critical period of His history when the antagonism of His nation became evident. Or, if He knew it, His method was a superb piece of dramatic action, as if He were in ignorance. From the beginning He sought for and claimed the faith of His people and declared His readiness at once to bring in the kingdom of God. He always implied and even asserted that He could have averted the overthrow of His nation—"How oft *would I . . . but ye would not.*" He strove to win the faith of men with the strenuousness of unlimited grace. And even when the vision of the cross loomed large in His outlook, so that He must face it as if inevitable, He continued to use every endeavour to avert it. What was the meaning of that bitter cry in the Garden, "If it

be possible, let this cup pass from me " ? Did it not recognise that even then it was not inevitable ? Where human will is involved, there is nothing fixed. And instead of regarding the cross as the only means of atonement, our Lord viewed it as in every way undesirable—undesirable for man's sake. It was an act of sin, and added sin to sin. It was the work of "wicked hands," and the whole blame of it rested with those who inflicted it.

But, if Jesus Himself thus reluctantly accepted the cross, there was, there must have been, an atonement for sin apart from His death and passion. Otherwise the success of His ministry would have been the undoing of the world. "The word became flesh . . . full of grace and truth," and contained within Himself all the energies effectively necessary to secure the restoration of man to God. "Jesus Christ the righteous" is in S. John's view "the propitiation for our sins." The Baptist says of Him, at a time when it is impossible to believe that he had any conception of the Messiah before him being destined to crucifixion—"Behold the lamb of God who is carrying (to carry away) the sin of the world !" He saw Him as the

One who was fulfilling the fundamental idea of a sin-offering—bearing, to bear away. And we, with our deeper insight into the spiritual experiences of Jesus Christ, ought to see more than he saw. It was not necessary for Christ to suffer the crown of thorns, the nails in hands and feet, and the darkness of death to bear the sin of the world. True, in all this He bore our sins in *His body*; but He had borne them before in soul and spirit with a terrible reality. And if, as we all believe, it is the universal law, that sin is done away by the good suffering for the wrong-doer, the Lamb of God bearing the sin of the world, the Good Shepherd giving His life for the sheep—all that would have been true in its most real sense, if the dark deed of Calvary had never made it true in the sphere of physical fact. Everything which is essential to atonement in the death on the cross was there before it.

And this leads me to notice that our Lord's statement of the conditions of salvation are often, and indeed generally, such as do not imply the necessity of His death by crucifixion. He almost always implies that a sound spiritual relation to Himself is in itself all which is

requisite. "He that believeth *on me* hath everlasting life." "This is eternal life, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." And I would add that oft misunderstood statement, "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." The sending of the Son of God and the faith in Him which His presence made possible, confer eternal life. And had His whole nation thus believed on Him they would have been redeemed without the cross, and the atonement would have been effected by that conjunction with Him which exists in faith.

Why, then, do we find that the apostolic writers so frequently refer to the cross and death of Christ as a sacrifice and offering for sin? This sacrificial interpretation of the death of Christ comes after the event, and must be interpreted by the apostolic experience. As has been said, the historic atonement includes the experience of the first disciples. The theology of the apostles was the translation

of their experience into thought ; and the terms in which they expressed that experience were necessarily such as they had previously used for like experiences. They found as a matter of fact that the death of Christ brought them a relief from the sense of God's displeasure and had a cleansing effect upon their moral activities. Accustomed to look for remission of sin and redemption from its control by sacrifice and offering, they naturally and rightly considered that He by His voluntary death fulfilled the idea of sacrifice—became an offering for sin. The more they dwelt upon the circumstances and forces which led to the crucifixion of the Christ, the more manifest it would become to them (1) that it was the sin of man that conceived and encompassed that awful act, and (2) that He, by enduring the contradiction to sinners against Himself, was striving against sin, and indeed yielded up His life to conquer sin. To them it became perfectly clear that it was a true, and for them the most true, interpretation of the cross and passion, that "he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God," that He "bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we, being

dead to sins, might live unto righteousness ; by whose stripes ye were healed." And that language is true for us, as for them. What sacrifice has been in the past ages to man in his desire to approach God and to renew fellowship with Him, all that is realised in and through the crucified Christ.

But although the apostolic thought assumed this form, it was not the only shape in which even they conceived of the atonement or reconciliation. There is the statement, "God was *in Christ* reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them ;" and "He that hath the Son hath life," and "Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him and he in God."

The actual reconciliation or conjunction of man with God explains and justifies all the terms in which the death and passion of Christ are spoken of. He suffered for us, over (*ὑπὲρ*) us, on our account. That which He suffered was the "curse" due to the transgressors of the law ; and in this sense He bore the penalty of sin. He was in the judgment of His nation "numbered with the transgressors," and by being put into the place of sinners our ini-

quities were laid upon Him. And as all such sufferings of the good for the evil are parts of the Divine plan, "He (God) hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin." And because by Him we come to the consciousness of the propitiousness of God which sin had hindered, "He is the propitiation for our sins." His death brings about the true relation of a sinner to God. "He is the mercy-seat . . . by his blood."

Yes, and even much of the later language concerning the passion of Christ acquires a possible significance. It stands for an effective means of removing all sin ; and that means the removal of all occasion of the wrath of God. God is reconciled to man when man is in the way of becoming righteous ; and it is the cross which reconciles Him. The relation following upon repentance, and existing in faith, conjoined with that which takes away sin, removes the only reason for withholding pardon—the condoning of and assent to a state of sin. The conscious freedom from the bonds of the past and the entrance on the freeness of a new life is redemption by the blood of Christ. And although we cannot say that our Lord's suffer-

ings were punitive, since God can only punish the guilty, and guilt only belongs to the sinner, yet was His death "instead of" our punishment. For, since all penal consequences of sin are directed either to the maintenance of righteousness or the reformation of the wrong-doer, because the cross of Christ effects both these more effectively than any retribution, it takes the place of our punishment. It is in a just sense a substitution for the wrath of God against sinners. But all these sacrificial and judicial terms of stating the manner in which sin is covered and taken away, are only true because in them are realised the principles which are of wider application, and which may be effectively embodied in other and different forms. If asked to analyse these principles, the best I can do at present is as follows:—(1) The fact of human sin affects the Divine mind and awakens the principle of *resolute opposition*, which may develop into either recovery by mercy, or by chastisement. (2) Both of these involve the principle of suffering within the sphere of the Divine consciousness; the Lamb of God suffers for the sinner both by his sin and by his punishment. (3) The facts above stated, for

reasons with which we may not yet be acquainted, if brought into actual contact with the human consciousness in which sin has power, has the virtue to dislodge sin—to obliterate it, blot it out. (4) That which no longer exists forms no part of the Divine judgment regarding any one ; so that the actual or prospective doing away of sin meets all the requirements of the nature and rule of God. And (5) any form or manner whereby these conditions are realised is an atonement, is *the* atonement in its absoluteness.

I will only add a few sentences from our Litany—

“By the mystery of thy holy Incarnation ; by thy holy Nativity and Circumcision ; by thy Baptism, Fasting, and Temptation,

Good Lord, deliver us.

By thine Agony and bloody Sweat ; by thy Cross and Passion ; by thy precious Death and Burial ; by thy glorious Resurrection and Ascension ; and by the coming of the Holy Ghost,

Good Lord, deliver us.”

THE KINGDOM OF GOD

A KINGDOM implies a king. A king possesses the power, right, and authority to exercise government; and he has also a sphere, or domain, in which this power of government is exercised. The term "kingdom" is employed in Holy Scripture in both these senses; for the attribute of kinship and for the sphere in which it is realised. The former sense appears in the following: "The woman whom thou sawest is the great city which hath a *kingdom* (or ruling power) over the kings of the earth" (*ἡ ἔχουσα βασιλείαν ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων τῆς γῆς*, Rev. xvii. 18); "And madest them to be unto our God a kingdom and priests" (*βασιλείαν καὶ ἱερεῖς*, v. 10). In the Revelation "kingdom" would seem to always mean power and dominion. In this sense it is used in 1 Cor. xv. 24, "He shall deliver up the kingdom (the dominion) to God, even the Father;" also in Luke i. 33, "And of his kingdom there shall be no end." For other instances see Cremer, under *βασιλεία*.

But in general the term "kingdom" stands for the territory or sphere in which the rule of a king is exercised. For example: "The devil . . . showeth him all the kingdoms of the world" (Matt. iv. 8), and "For nation shall rise up against nation, and kingdom against kingdom" (xxiv. 7). In this sense a kingdom may be extended and enlarged, or it may be lost. It is something different from the king's right to rule and his royal authority, which reside in his own person. A certain territory may belong to a king as of right and authority, and yet it may not be under his dominion. In this sense, if a territory or sphere comes under the dominion of another, it then belongs to, or forms, another kingdom.

The phrases "the kingdom of God" and "the kingdom of heaven" are generally employed to designate *the sphere of things in which the rule of God is effectually exercised*. But there are probably cases in which the idea of the royal power, or dominion, is the more correct. Indeed the sphere of the dominion and the dominion itself are, in the kingdom of God, so intimately connected that the sense seems to shade off the one into the other. "The king-

dom of heaven" may designate the sphere of a certain dominion, or it may designate the dominion of heaven over another sphere.

Universal kingship belongs to God as His property ; but the actual sphere of His rule may be limited by the self-restraint which is necessary to give place to creature free-action. There may thus be spheres in God's rightful domain where His kingdom is not realised, either because He waits its willing acceptance, or because it has been wilfully rejected. This world is God's creation and is sustained in every part by His power, exercised either immediately or by delegation ; and yet it may not be His kingdom,—the sphere of His actual rule. That this world was not under the government of God in all respects is clearly implied in our Lord's assertion, "The kingdom of heaven is at hand"—is near. In the prayer which He taught His disciples He left them to understand that if it existed in some other sphere, it had to enter this world—"Thy kingdom come." Jesus Christ distinguished between the then existent state of the world and "the kingdom of God." He seems to have thought it no disparagement of His Father to

say that He was not ruling all things in the world. But that rule might come by being introduced from without ;—"If I by the finger of God cast out devils, then is the kingdom of God come upon you" (ἐφ' ὑμᾶς, Luke xi. 20). Indeed Jesus explicitly teaches that Satan had the dominion of the world—"The *prince of the world* cometh ; and hath nothing in me" (ὁ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρχων, John xiv. 30). That sphere of things in which God did not dominate lay outside His kingdom, and had its own prince. But in the person and activity of His Son, God's kingdom came near, came *to* this world. The two kingdoms might touch each other as boundaries of two hostile dominions ; but they are distinct and should be distinguished.

The idea of the kingdom of God in the New Testament is connected with that which had been taught before in the Old Testament, and was at the time of our Lord generally believed in by the Jews. This again was grounded upon the idea of God which underlies all ancient designations of Him,—that He is the sole source of power and being. Thus control, rule, kingship is implied. This dominion over the order of nature and all created beings is prominent

in, and pervades, all the Old Testament scriptures. This conception is an ideal one ; and can be best accounted for by supposing it to be the reflection of what was once the reality. For, however much some modern theories of evolution and progressive development may appear to militate against it, the idea and fact of the Fall will stand as the only explanation of what is. The kingdom of God, both over nature and man, was once a fact. He ruled over all His works at the first. But when man set aside the kindly sway of God's spiritual and moral rule, God's rule in him was cut off ; and at the same time His rule over things was modified. The ideal conception remained, after the reality had passed, to be the basis of an elevating hope.

In the Hebrew theocracy the moral and spiritual rule of man by God is, in a measure, exemplified, and so shadows forth His kingdom over men in its higher degree. It was a special part of the mission of the prophets to exalt and to teach this idea of a kingdom of God among men, in which He alone should rule, and which should be established by the Messiah, God's anointed vicegerent. The somewhat later con-

ception is given in the Book of Daniel, where the author, writing of the coming of the Ancient of Days in the clouds of heaven like unto a Son of Man, says, "And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him: his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed" (Dan. vii. 14). Here "dominion" means the kingly authority and power, and "kingdom" the sphere in which his rule is effectively realised. We thus see how the Old Testament presents the conception of an actual divine rule, different from the general providence of God,—a kingdom coming from heaven into the world, which shall be an effective government of men by God's anointed One. And, although the Jews at the time of our Lord had imperfect conceptions of the nature of this kingdom of God, yet they were fundamentally right in that they held it to be an order of things new to the world, which it was the special mission of the Messiah to establish. The New Testament conception and teaching concerning the kingdom of God is an interpretation, and not a contradiction, of the Jewish hope.

The terms under which this kingdom is spoken of in the New Testament are "the kingdom of heaven," "the kingdom of God," or "of Christ," and "the kingdom."

"The kingdom of heaven" is in the Greek "the kingdom of the heavens." The plural is significant and necessary. This particular phrase originated in the schools of the Rabbis, amongst whom the belief in a plurality of heavens was common. From them it was adopted by S. Matthew, who wrote his gospel especially for the Jews. The plurality of the heavens was taught both by our Lord and the apostles. The Lord's Prayer opens thus, "Our Father which art in the heavens;" and Jesus said, "In my Father's house are many mansions." S. Paul speaks of "the heavenly places" or "the heavenlies," and "the things in the heavens" (R.V.), and of the hope laid up "in the heavens" (R.V.); also he says that Christ has ascended "far above all the heavens" (R.V.), which is elsewhere expressed as "above all rule and authority and power and dominion." "The heavens" designates the higher order of things and beings where God is and all holy beings; and "the kingdom of the heavens" denotes

(1) the sphere in which the dominion of God is at present realised and existent ; (2) the rule of God in its contact with that which is not of His kingdom, as in certain of the parables ; and (3) it suggests that the kingdom of God in this world will be realised and “come” by the dominion of God’s heavens over this order—the extension of that dominion into the present world by “the powers of the world to come” passing into it. When our Lord said, “The kingdom of the heavens is at hand,” He spoke of the near approach in His own person of all the powers and agencies for the realisation of God’s rule in the world.

The phrase “the kingdom of God” designates the same kingdom. This designation never occurs in S. Matthew except where our Lord employs it, the evangelist always using “the kingdom of the heavens.” The other evangelists never employ “the kingdom of the heavens.” According to S. Matthew, our Lord employed both designations. It would appear that the phrases are synonymous, and that they are used interchangeably. The evangelists who wrote for the Gentiles as well as Jews always employ the designation “the kingdom of God,” because,

in all probability, the phrase "the kingdom of the heavens" would not convey a distinct and true idea to the Gentiles. The expression "kingdom of God" particularly marks the personal centre and source of the rule, namely, God; whereas "the kingdom of the heavens" points rather to the sphere in which the rule is already exercised, and by the agency of which it is to be enlarged and extended. That is, the kingdom of God among men will come from above, from an invisible and spiritual world, from what may rightly be called the supernatural, coming to dominate this world and all which is in it.

The kingdom of God is distinguished from this world, or the world as it is. They are in some sort antagonistic. This is certainly so of the human world separate from and opposed to God. And without drifting into the ancient heresy, that this earth is the work of some inferior deity, it may yet be viewed as not exhibiting and realising the condition in which God is "all in all" and Christ "fills all things." The present state of creation conforms to the condition of man rather than to the essential nature of God. Our Lord attributed so much of the condition of things

in the world to evil, that He designated Satan "the prince of this world." And when before Pilate, He said, "My kingdom is not of this world" (John xviii. 36)—literally, it is "*not out of this world*" (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου): not derived in any sense from or out of that which is the world. The source of it, the forces of it, the materials of it, are not contained in this world and its order. It is not, and cannot be, the mere improvement or readjustment of the things that are in the world as parts of the world; nor is it an evolution of its self-contained forces. It comes from without, or rather from above. And so our Lord distinguishes Himself and His own from the world as not belonging to it: "They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world" (John xvii. 14). At the time of Christ the world was not the sphere of God's rule; but He came as the Messiah, to bring in the kingdom of God. Did He accomplish this intention?

The declaration of Jesus Christ, "The kingdom of the heavens is at hand," implies that there was some more than ordinary approach of

"the powers of the world to come," and that some unusual possibilities were then present. But the expression does not necessarily carry in it the certainty of the coming of the kingdom in the immediate future. Indeed, the call for newness of mind seems to imply that that personal preparation is necessary, if what is near is to "come." An important point to be observed is, that the kingdom of heaven is, so to speak, wrapped up in, contained in, and inseparably connected with, the person of Christ; so that where He is the kingdom is, and when He is rejected the kingdom is also rejected. We are justified in believing that it was our Lord's aim and intention to bring in the kingdom, which was near; but it was also His aim and intention to bring His nation to a faith in, and a loyalty to, Himself, which He never secured. "How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!" (Matt. xxiii. 37). He acknowledges *failure*, and failure for which He is in no wise responsible. And may He not have failed to bring in the kingdom of the heavens? The hopeful possibility which

rings in the declaration of the nearness of the kingdom at the opening of His ministry seems wholly lacking in the latter part of His life. In two of His later sayings He brings up the idea of a nearness of the kingdom, but there is another tone discernible in what He says. "If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then is the kingdom of God come upon you" (Matt. xii. 28) ; but the context reveals no hope that it will be realised in those addressed, but rather the contrary. And when He speaks to His disciples of their knowing that the kingdom of God is nigh, it is to be by occurrences and changes lying beyond His life here, and connected with His second advent (Matt. xxiv. 33 ; Mark xiii. 29). On one occasion, however, He used an expression which in the rendering of the A.V. seems to affirm the presence of the kingdom of God—"The kingdom of God is *within* you" (Luke xvii. 21). The Greek is ἐν τοῖς ὑμῶν, and in the margin of R.V. is given as "in the midst of you." The context shows that the words were particularly addressed to the Pharisees. Jesus could not say the kingdom was *in them* ; but He might say it was in their midst, since it was

embodied in Himself. The question of the Pharisees is, *when* the kingdom of God cometh ; and the whole of our Lord's subsequent discourse views the coming as in the future. It is not now "near." The kingdom which was near at the beginning of the Lord's ministry is put back, because the moral change of mind and the readiness to accept Him, which would have admitted the establishment of it, are wanting. And so, after the failure of men to grasp this great opportunity, our Lord looks to the coming of His kingdom as in a distant future.

This receding of the kingdom into the future is manifest in our Lord's mode of referring to it—"Verily I say unto you, I will no more drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God" (Mark xiv. 25) ; and "When ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets, in the kingdom of God, and yourselves cast forth without" (Luke xiii. 28). And in all the later references to the revelation of the kingdom on the earth, our Lord connects it with His second coming. There is one statement addressed to His disciples which seems an exception, as if the kingdom would immediately come

—"There be some of them that stand here which shall in no wise taste of death till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom" (Matt. xvi. 28). Six days after He showed Himself to the chosen three in the Transfiguration, which was the fulfilment of this ; for they saw Him as He is and comes in His kingdom.

Was our Lord, then, in error when He said at the beginning of His ministry, "The kingdom of the heavens is at hand"? No ; most certainly not. He never was in error. The kingdom of God *was* then at hand ; but it had receded into the distance by reason of the unbelief of men. And our Lord's change of viewing it and speaking of it was strictly according to the facts of the case. A larger question, as to the extent to which our Lord allowed His look into things to advance, emerges here, but cannot be now sufficiently entered into. It is enough to say that limited knowledge is not the same as error.

We come now to the age of the apostles, and must consider their position in regard to the kingdom. It is seldom referred to as the kingdom in either the Acts, or the Epistles, or the Book of the Revelation ; and when mentioned

it is generally as future, or in the future world. There are, however, a few passages which seem to regard the kingdom as a present fact; *e.g.* "Who . . . translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his love" (Col. i. 13); "Who calleth you into (or unto?) his own kingdom" (1 Thess. ii. 12); and "Wherefore, receiving a kingdom that cannot be shaken, let us have grace," &c. (Heb. xii. 28). These passages may imply a present union with and entrance into the kingdom of heaven by an individual submission to the rule of God and to "the powers of the world to come," without the kingdom being realised in the present order of the world. Just as Jesus Christ was the personal embodiment of the kingdom, so any effectual subordination of mind and life to His dominion is so far, but only so far, the kingdom of God. But that kingdom, as set forth in Holy Scripture, is a much larger thing than such individual submission involves.

Although the kingdom of God does not stand out so prominently in the apostolic writings as in the Gospels, the Second Advent does, and takes its place. The revelation of the Lord from heaven is the event which is to precede

and usher in the kingdom. And this is viewed as the future hope of the Christian, and is regarded as approximately near, as "at hand," in the same way in which our Lord at the beginning spoke of the kingdom being "at hand." The apostles lived in almost daily expectation of Christ's second coming, and so of the kingdom. It seemed at hand. Was it only a seeming, or a fact? It is generally supposed that the apostles were mistaken. It is much more reasonable to believe that the result of the passion of our Lord, His ascension to the heavens and the descent of the Holy Spirit, was, that the possibility of the immediate coming of the kingdom was restored; but that the response of man to the Divine energies was not sufficient to admit of its establishment, and therefore it again recedes. The later period of the apostolic age is marked by an increased activity of the anti-Christian forces; and the last of the apostles sees "many false prophets," "many antichrists" and "the whole world lieth in the evil one" (ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ, 1 John v. 19). That which was near in the early age of the Church is not realised, but recedes into the distance.

In the above, it is implied that the time of the revelation of the Son of God and the coming of the kingdom of the heavens is not fixed; and that it is dependent upon, or is conditioned by, the free development of human life. Hence S. Peter in his second Epistle, iii. 12, uses the phrase, "Looking for and *hastening* the coming of the day of God" (R.V. marg.), which finds a reflection in our Burial Office, in which we pray that God would "accomplish the number of his elect, and *hasten* his kingdom." The Advent is fixed in the mind of the Father, in that "*the time for it*," as we should say, and the conditions of it, are determined in Him.

The apostolic age did not see the kingdom of God; it passed away, and left the great hope of the rule of God unrealised. The Church, which Christ had formed to preach the gospel of the kingdom and to prepare for it, had made great advancements, but it was not the kingdom. It was rather our Lord's substitute for the kingdom when the latter was rendered impossible,—a community in the midst of a hostile kingdom to act as a sphere of influence until His rule might come.

“The kingdom of the heavens” has not yet come. “The Lord’s throne is in the heavens,” and there He rules. “The earth hath he given to the children of men,” and there others rule. It is sad to think that the glorious and gracious possibilities which lay before our Lord at His coming into the world were not realised ; but it would be more sad if we had to think of this world and human life in it, even Christian human life, as the rule of God. It is, in some sort, a relief to think that this world, even the Christian part of it, is *not* the kingdom of God. We hear much of the *failure* of Christianity ; and we may be in too great a hurry to deny it. For shall we say that what *is* is its success ? Rather let us admit that, as our Lord failed to win His purpose at the first, but waits with certainty for its full accomplishment, so there is a failure of Christianity because it has never been fully accepted, but that it waits for the kingdom of God. And that kingdom *will* come.

Until we have quite cleared our minds of the mistaken notion that the kingdom of God has come, we are not in a position to have a firm faith that it will come, nor to understand what

its coming means. That is paradoxical, and so are many of the greatest truths. If any one believes that human life and the world as they are to-day are the result of God's rule, then he must regard that rule as inefficient, impotent, and incapable of mastering man and matter. It is little short of blasphemy to suppose that things as they are are God's good government. It were as if we should say that the fraud, and vice, and crime of society are parts of the influence of the Christian Church. That would mean that Christianity cannot make men virtuous. And to say that the kingdom of God has come, and yet things continue as they were from the beginning, and in some senses worse than in the beginning, is equivalent to saying that the kingdom of God does not mean an effective government of things. If, however, we are clear that the kingdom of God has *not* come, then we may hope there is another and different ordering of things yet to come.

The kingdom of God *may* come: it is quite possible for "the powers of the world to come," "the kingdom of the heavens" to enter into and dominate this world and all things in it.

To be able to say this is to get rid of many prevalent misconceptions. It is in itself a large advance in knowledge and in faith.

When Jesus said, "The kingdom of heaven is at hand," "The kingdom of God has come upon you," "The kingdom of heaven is among you," He spoke of a then present fact. And the fact was, that *in Himself* was the kingly power, in Him was the efficient government, in Him was all which was needed to constitute the kingdom of God. And He not only asked to be believed in as an efficient King, but He proved it, revealed it, demonstrated it. One of the very purposes of His coming was to make manifest that He personally was competent to establish "the kingdom of the heavens," that He was God's Anointed, the Christ. It was necessary that He should exhibit His ability to rule, and to rule after the manner of the kingdom of the heavens. And His life might be studied with great advantage from this point of view. He had to demonstrate, and He did demonstrate, that He could govern men and things, spirits and bodies, things visible and invisible. His miracles of grace and His signs and wonders

are revelations of His ability to bring in the kingdom of God. Where He is allowed by faith in Himself, He rules and raises the human heart and soul to righteousness, as in His disciples ; and where He is not voluntarily submitted to, He yet dominates and commands, as in evil spirits. Where His personal power is accepted He heals the sick, the halt, the blind ; and without this even, He can feed the multitudes and raise the widow's son to life. He is master of the inner nature of matter ; can transmute water into wine, and, by stilling the storm, direct the great atmospheric forces. He can even take the substances of His dead body and quicken them into a spiritual substance in His resurrection body ; and then with that spiritual body eat common bread and fish and make them part of His spiritual self. And to crown all, He can carry this very matter of the world, of the earth earthy, back to its central source, far above all heavens, and make it the eternal medium of all the Godhead. He spoke the very truth when He said the three should, in His Transfiguration, "see the Son of man coming in his kingdom." For what was the Transfiguration but the spiritual personality

of Christ conquering flesh and matter and all the time and earth conditions, and making them reveal their capacity for becoming by Him what they are not? In this wonderful personality, in the Son of God, you see, if you will see, the unveiling of the mastery of minds willing and unwilling, and the revelation of the One who is in command of all the inner life of matter. The only scientific interpretation of the world, the only source of higher evolution in man is in the personal power of Christ. And His whole life is a testimony to His kingship; to His ability and His claim to establish the kingdom of God. God's kingdom may come: Jesus Christ showed how.

In the prophets the picture stands in clear form of a King who should rule men in and by righteousness, of a dominion which should subdue all savagery in man and beasts, of changes in the social order and in the material sphere which should make human life rich in all blessings—no more wrong, no more sorrow, no more want. In the apostolic teaching the moral and spiritual renovation of man by the gospel takes the first place—as it must do; but all through there is the

underlying thought that *the* power that is working in man through faith is *the same* power that wrought in Christ and which raised Him from the dead ; that is, that the miraculous power manifested in the personality of Christ, and which had command of all nature, is the same power that is working in the Christian soul. Or, to turn this round, the inward energy which is the rule of God in the spirit and heart is *the* power which is capable of subduing all things, invisible and visible. And so the apostles teach the possibility of "new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness" (2 Peter iii. 13), and that "the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God." All matter is to be liberated from its present laws of bondage and waste. Christ shall "fill all things" and God the Father by His dominion shall be "all in all" ; and then "the kingdom of the world shall become the kingdom of our Lord, and of his Christ." And the revelation of Jesus Christ in His control over all forms and forces of life is the testimony to the truth of the prophetic anticipation

and the ground of the apostolic hope. It is only the inability of men to see the significance of our Lord's manifested kingship which stands in the way of believing that God's kingdom may come ; and it is only the unwillingness of men to submit to the one spiritual power which can bring in this rule which prevents it from coming. And it is the want of the faith that it may come which causes so many to look to other and futile means for mending this sad world.

The good that can be, will be : the kingdom of God *will* come. It is foretold in ancient prophecy ; it receives its most clear and emphatic witness in the Lord Jesus, the Christ ; and all inspired teaching of the apostolic age upholds the same hope. This in itself is enough for faith to reach full assurance, whatever inexplicable difficulties and whatever uncertainties may attach to the manner of its realisation.

The possibility of the kingdom lies in the being of God, of Him out of whose spiritual activity all creature life came ; in whom resides all the power of heaven and earth ; to whom nothing is a miracle which He wills shall be.

His will only waits the supreme moment. And it is the existence in Him of this eternal purpose to bring all things into unity with Himself which alone explains how the conception of the kingdom came to dawn upon the human mind. "Nature" can only give what nature has. If the unity and uniformity of nature and its unerring evolution be as true as science testifies, either it must be said that the hope has been evolved out of things, and is necessarily contained in them as the final goal of all ; or that nature, so uniform in her workings, has produced in the human heart the greatest of all lies—a grand and blessed hope which will not, cannot, be. And if it be said that nature does not testify to this, but that it has been derived from some source outside of and different from nature, then it may be answered, "Yes, that is what we mean by a supernatural revelation,—a communication to man of that which is not necessarily contained in and to be inferred from things as they are."

But although the natural order does not contain the hope of the kingdom of God, it everywhere declares the necessity for it ; and the more recent developments of scientific

knowledge reveal the capabilities of nature for becoming subject to the rule of God. The flexibility of matter ; that it has inner qualities which render it capable of giving out new and surprising phenomena ; that it may indeed be so changed as to be transmuted ; all tends to show that the present properties and activities of matter are not its only possibilities. And the recent observations of the human mind's susceptibility to purely spiritual activities, as in telepathy and similar phenomena, indicate the possibility of human life being effectively regulated by spiritual power. There are, moreover, intimations in various ways of a close connection between the human mind and the inner states of matter by which its phenomena are determined. This relation is manifest in the Son of Man, and is fundamental to Him through (*διὰ*) whom all things were made. That a restored humanity should become the medium for a restored world, both as to social order and in the sphere of physical phenomena, is in harmony with, if not inferable from, this. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation" (Luke xvii. 21)—in a manner which can be seen ; but from the unseen, the inner-

ness of things. The whole universe is indeed ready for the One Great Mind to throb through it, and then it will rise into a new and blessed order in which God shall be "all in all." Only the state of man bars, for the present, this great consummation. But that barrier will one day be removed ; and what will that kingdom be like ? We will wait and see.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE HOLY EUCHARIST

THIS is strictly an essay, being an attempt to arrive at clearness of apprehension on certain points concerning the Holy Eucharist by a free and independent examination of them philosophically. The method adopted is not intended to be a substitute for the exegetical and historical examination of this subject, but is employed as supplementary to them, in order to test certain possible positions. The writer does not even venture to say that certainty will be reached in this pursuit. At the outset he has no definite position to defend, but only purposes to go where inquiry and thought will lead.

If, as is possible, some hesitation may be felt in following the method we propose to adopt, it will be well to remind you that while the doctrine of the Eucharist is a theological, it is also emphatically a metaphysical, question. If,

as we frequently find, statements are made in regard to it by opposing schools of theological thought which imply and necessarily involve metaphysics, we are justified in examining the statements metaphysically. If we are to attach any clear notion to the doctrine of the Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, we must examine what such a phrase connotes, and whether it is a possible conception. For unless we are clear on these points, we may be holding to an error. Indefiniteness of thought is sometimes necessary, but it is always more or less dangerous. For while the indefiniteness may be due to an insufficient apprehension of a truth, it *may* be the blurred effect of mingling ideas which are inconsistent and irreconcilable.

The two points which we propose to examine are (1) that after the words of consecration the bread and wine become the Body and Blood of Christ ; and (2) that, since Christ is really present under the forms of bread and wine, He is to be adored as under the veil of the consecrated elements. These two points have been put forward prominently as the doctrine of the Church of England and the Catholic Faith on the Eucharist. We are not now concerned with

the question whether this is the teaching of our Church or no ; but we will simply examine these statements.

(1) Taking the first, that after the words of consecration the bread and wine become the Body and Blood of Christ, you will observe that everything depends upon what is meant by "become." If it means the change of the substances of the bread and wine into the substances of the Body and Blood of Christ, then you have transubstantiation. Only the accidents or phenomena of the bread and wine remain, without their underlying noumena or causes. That, we should say, is a metaphysical impossibility. But we do not think this is intended to be the sense of "become." Another possible meaning would be that they become the *figure* or type of the Body and Blood of Christ. That is possible, but it is evidently not what is meant by those who say that they do *become* the Body and Blood. Nor would a purely figurative meaning satisfy the sense of the expression "to become." It means either a change of one thing into another ; or a change of use, while the thing remains the same in all its parts and necessary substance. This latter sense of "become"

involves neither change of substance, nor of the form and state of the substance. The bread and the wine may remain bread and wine, and yet *become* the Body and Blood of Christ.

But in order to see how this may be, and how it cannot be, we must first consider what is meant by the term Body of Christ. We shall confine our attention at first to this point. The body of Christ may mean the body which was born of the Virgin Mary ; which was, and ever will be, the medium of the manifestation of God. Secondly, the body of Christ may mean some other instrument or means of His manifestation and activity ; for example, "the Church, which is his body." In both these there is the common idea of that which is the medium of His spiritual presence and activity. Body is an organ of spiritual presence.

Now, when it is said that after consecration the element bread *becomes* the Body of Christ, in which of the two above senses are we to think of His body ? Are we to understand that the bread becomes the body that was born of the Virgin ? Observe, the question is not, Does the body of our Lord which was born of the Virgin become bread ? That is not inconceivable. But it is

the converse of this which is stated ; that the bread becomes the body born of the Virgin. That is only possible on one of two suppositions : either that the substance of the bread goes back in time and is incorporated into the body so born, which is manifestly absurd and cannot be meant ; or that the substance of the bread becomes incorporated into that body as it is now spiritualised and glorified in the heavens. But, if that were so, what remains on the altar is nothing but phenomena, without any kind of substance whatever. Not only is there no natural substance, but there is no spiritual Presence under them. The body into which the substance bread is changed is in the heavens still, and it is evident that such an accretion to the body of the Lord in glory would bring no presence of the Lord which did not exist before.

There is only one other possible sense in which by consecration the bread becomes the Body of our Lord. I have said that body is the organ of spirit. Any means or instrument by which spirit efficiently communicates its presence to others, if such instrument can be found, is its body. In this sense the Church is the body of Christ ; for by it He continues to

reveal Himself and to exert His activity within and beyond the Church. If we may suppose our Lord to employ any other visible means for the same end—that is, as a means of communication between Himself and others—then that which before was not His body *becomes* His body when employed for this end. It might, and would, remain in all respects the thing it was before, and yet become His body; and also, except when used as the means of communication, would be only the thing by itself. But when this, which is in itself a thing, is set apart to be the means of communication, it might *then*, even before the actual communication is effected, be truly and rightly called the body of the Lord. Indeed, it would be more true to call it so, and thus to express the distinguishing purpose conferred upon it, than to call it by the name proper to it apart from that purpose. According to this line of thought the bread by consecration may, and would, *become* the Body of Christ, although remaining bread in itself: it would, from the moment it was set apart as the means of the Lord's Presence, be rightly and truly considered and termed the Body of Christ. The same line

of thought may be taken in reference to the second element—wine, if by Blood is understood that in which life consists or dwells.

It will be apparent, however, from the above, that the expressions, "the Body of Christ" and "*becomes* His Body," leave unanswered the question whether the actual communication between Christ and His people emerges immediately upon consecration, or is subsequent to, and dependent on, reception. That question can only be settled, if it can be settled by our method of examination, by considering some other matters.

We may pause here to ask, What then would be the relation of this Body of the Lord by consecration to the body born of the Virgin, and which is now in glory? We were not able to see that, in any real and effective sense, the substance of the bread becomes by consecration the body which was born of the Virgin. There is, however, a true and spiritual sense in which the bread which is, or is to be, the means of the Lord's Presence, becomes the same as the body born of the Virgin. The sameness and identity would not consist of substance, but of use and efficiency. It, remaining bread, answers the

end of the Virgin-born body, takes its place, and becomes it for us as the means of His Presence.

This last thought suggests a probable explanation of the use of the term "types," as employed by the Fathers to denote the consecrated elements. It is certainly not an accurate explanation of the phrases "This is my body" and "This is my blood" to construe them as meaning "This is the figure of my body" and "This is the figure of my blood," if thereby it is meant that the sacramental Body and Blood are something distinct and separable from the elements so designated. But it would be quite correct to designate the consecrated elements "types" of the Body and Blood of Christ, if by these latter we understand, as I suggest the Fathers did, the body born of the Virgin and the blood of that body which was shed for the sin of the world. Then the term "types," instead of emptying the expression "This is my body" and "This is my blood" of their full and correct sense, would mean that they are "types" by taking the place of and answering to the body and blood of the Incarnate Son of God. There would be, as there always is in true types, an underlying unity of spiritual fact.

And thus to say that the consecrated elements are types of the Body and Blood of Christ is more true when the elements subserve the same purposes as the Virgin-born body and blood, than if they were mere figures or pictures only.

We must now return to the question whether the contact and communion of Christ with His people, which is His Presence, and which alone justifies the phrases "This is my body" and "This is my blood" being applied to the elements bread and wine—whether this contact is established immediately on consecration or subsequently, *i.e.* on right reception. We concluded that neither of these statements, not even the phrase, "become His Body and Blood," place the matter beyond uncertainty.

The contact of Christ with His people is what we understand to be meant by His Presence in the Holy Eucharist. "Presence" may mean two things. It may mean a person or thing is "*in*" a place or relation, even if not perceived by, or presented to, the consciousness of a person. Light is in this sense present to the blind, though they do not see it; and God is everywhere present, even with those who have no consciousness of Him. The other sense of

“presence” is that of a thing or person consciously realised—perceived to be there. Now, the Presence in the Holy Communion must be of the latter kind; that is, the Lord must actually come into relation with the conscious powers of His people. Otherwise there is no other Presence to them in the Holy Eucharist than exists apart from it, not only for them, but for all men; for Christ is, in the former sense of “presence,” everywhere. When, then, and by what means is this actual contact given?

The consciousness of man may be in relation with two orders of things—the external and the internal, the visible and the “invisible.” In the Holy Eucharist, to which faculty or department of consciousness is the Lord present or presented? Do the elements of bread and wine after consecration, in and of themselves, give this Presence of Christ? Or, in other words, is the contact of the Lord with the consciousness of His people in and by external consciousness? Not, is the Presence *suggested*? Our question is more than that. Is it *given*?—given so that the elements themselves *convey* a consciousness of the living Personality, just as

in a living human body the presence of the living human being is *given*. We cannot perceive in sense a living human body without also apprehending in consciousness the presence of a human being. Now, can it be said, as a matter of consciousness, that the consecrated elements *give* the Lord's Presence in the same manner, with and by the external consciousness of the elements? If so, He would be presented consciously to every one who looked upon the elements, independently of faith and without respect to their spiritual condition. This is not merely a matter of reasoning; it is a question of conscious experience. And conscious experience is that they do *not* convey of themselves the sense of personal presence; they rather exclude the idea. Indeed, the elements of bread and wine, by their external phenomena alone, do not even *suggest a living presence*, even when consecrated. For while we may truly regard them as the Body and Blood of Christ, they are separated one from the other; and all our knowledge of body and blood in separation involves the *absence* of the living personality to whom they belong. So, neither by direct perception, nor by necessary suggestion, is the

Presence of the Lord given in and to external consciousness.

The actual contact of Christ with the consciousness of His people is, therefore, to be looked for in *internal* consciousness. The Lord Himself is a spiritual objectivity, *i.e.* He has being apart from the personal *ego*, man; and if presented to him must be presented to the faculty which perceives spiritual objectivity; namely, to the internal consciousness. The internal consciousness deals with matters which do not require the use of the senses, such as mathematical and logical conceptions. And spiritual consciousness is a special and higher department of this internal consciousness. It is to this alone that the Lord is, or can be, presented; and the only contact between Him and man's consciousness which is possible must be internal. It may follow and be made dependent on what is external, but in itself it is entirely internal. It is for this reason that a special preparation is necessary to receive the Presence, a preparation which puts the inner consciousness in a state to be able to be acted upon by the Lord. The Presence of the Lord is *to* the internal consciousness; and His Pre-

sence, therefore, is *where*, if we may so speak, the power is that can alone perceive Him. He is not under the forms of bread and wine in the ordinary sense, viz. in the sense of location. He *is* where He is perceived, *within*, or rather *before*, the spirit. But He is there, not as a mere subjective state of the soul : He is there as a real and objective Personality.

We now ask, When does that peculiar state of consciousness emerge—that spiritual susceptibility in response to which the Presence is given ? A certain internal fitness is necessary, which the Church embodies in the requirements stated at the close of the Catechism—repentance, faith, charity. But since all these may exist before and apart from any part of the Eucharistic Service, it is manifest that these alone—except *perhaps* in some special cases where the Holy Communion may not be had—do not furnish a full realisation of the conditions for the Presence which is given in the Eucharist, otherwise it would be superfluous. It is admitted on all hands that whenever is the time of the Presence, it is dependent upon the act of consecration, even if subsequent. But is that act and the internal fitness of the faithful all

that is necessary to secure that contact of the Lord with them which is His Presence? May not some act on the part of the faithful also be necessary?—necessary, I mean, by the Lord's appointment. That He did ordain such is certain: He said, "Take, eat," and "Drink ye all of it." Now, it is certain that these acts of reception must have had *some* spiritual end. But if the Presence of the Lord is given at the consecration of the elements, then the subsequent acts are *not* necessary to His Presence. Either, then, the commands "Take, eat," and "Drink ye all of it," are superfluous—which we cannot admit; or the Presence is not the entire benefit of the sacrament; or the Presence is not given until after reception. Opinions will differ as to which of these two last alternatives we should accept; but we must not, on our method of inquiry, be content with any *opinion*. We must, if possible, ascertain the fact. It is, however, perfectly clear that *some* benefit of the Eucharist is distinctly implied as dependent on the commands "Take, eat," and "Drink ye all of it." Also, as we have seen already, the Presence must be to the internal and spiritual consciousness. Whether the Presence

contains the whole benefit is an important point also.

We shall probably reach a solution of all these points, if we examine more carefully what we are to understand by the Presence of Christ *in the Eucharist*. We are clear that it is personal, that it is given to the spiritual faculties, and that it is thus objective and real. It has in some quarters been suggested that the Presence is that of the Lord's humanity. I only refer to this to remark, that the orthodox faith is that our Lord's humanity and divinity are united never to be divided; and that, therefore, the presence of Christ always means the undivided Christ. The question which presents itself most prominently is, Whether the Presence in the Holy Eucharist differs in any way from the Lord's presence at other times—as, for example, in private or public prayers? For, I presume, it is beyond all question that the Lord is present at such times, and does come into relation with His people's inner consciousness. Some difference there must be, or there is no sufficient reason for the Eucharist. This may be considered as one of degree, or of kind and purpose. It is possible, but not probable, that our

Lord would ordain a special rite merely to intensify an ordinary experience. And yet it is the less probable, since every devout worshipper could, by the voluntary exercise of his spiritual power, attain to a fuller measure of the consciousness of His Lord as the object of worship *without* a special ordinance.

The Holy Eucharist *is* a special rite, with special acts for both priest and people ; and the only sound inference is that it has a special purpose, and that the Presence given therein, or thereby, is not identical with that realisable in worship and prayer, but differs from it *in kind*. Have we any clue to this in the institution itself ? I think we have. If the Presence were the same as in worship, and for that end, it *might* be given in and on consecration. And had the bread and wine been by the institution left upon the altar, or only presented to the view of the worshippers after consecration, we might have supposed that the end was a presence for adoration. But the Lord said, "Take, eat, this is my body," and "This is my blood. . . Drink ye all of it." If the Presence were for worship, the most natural thing would be the reservation of the elements which are by

consecration the means of the Presence. That they are to be received by the communicant *suggests* that there is a communication with the Lord different from that given in worship. And our Lord's words, "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood dwelleth in me, and *I in him*" (S. John vi. 56), teaching as they do that there is another presence of the Lord than that in which He is *with* us and *before* us, would, if taken in connection with the commands "Take, eat," and "Drink ye," seem to place it beyond all doubt that the Lord instituted the supper to give a presence of Himself *in* His people, a presence which is different from that in which He is *looked to* in worship.

That there is a real and vital difference between Christ presented *to* us as the object of worship and Christ dwelling *in* us, will, I think, be clear to every one who has given attention to the New Testament teaching. "Christ *in* you" is something special, unique; and is the culmination of all Christian experience; and it is this presence which is the special grace or gift of the Holy Communion. In it our Lord is specially present in the consciousness of His people. Consciousness in man covers and

includes three faculties : cognition or knowing, feeling or affection, and conation or effort. The presence of the Lord for worship is given to the cognitive faculty, and the worship is the response of the feelings and affections. He is presented to, and His presence is responded to by, those spiritual faculties which recognise and realise ; and in such acts of devotion there is no necessary indwelling—the Lord is contemplated only, and mentally held as apart from self, looked upon. A further presence is possible, which consists of an entrance of the Lord into the other faculty of man—the faculty of will and effort. This is in consciousness, being the consciousness of Him “working in us to will and to do,” and endowing us with new powers of action. In this respect He becomes as food and refreshment, building up and giving force to the powers of life. But, as effort affects and develops the faculties of knowing and feeling, so the entrance of the Lord into the conative or effort-making powers increases worship and quickens the sense of the Lord as its object, in addition to bestowing a fuller sense of oneness and fellowship of life and action.

The Presence of the Lord is, as we have seen,

given to the internal consciousness ; and it is given to be *within* as distinct from *before*, and is in the region of effort and life. Now, such Presence requires some fitness or internal state corresponding thereto : something different from worship, something in which the inner life becomes receptive of a power and a Presence transcending knowledge, something in which the One believed in, loved, and adored can take hold of and use, beyond our powers of using, the efforts and outgoings of our life. Such a state, it seems to me, is reached when we draw near with faith and take the sacrament which, if it means anything, means that we *accept in will the Lord's way of making us partakers of Him*, of His offering of Himself, and of the life He gave for us. A sacrament is especially fitted to be used by Him for this end, because the right use by us implies the right mind for Him to take as the dwelling for His inworking.

From the above considerations, it seems that the Presence of the Lord in the Holy Eucharist is given by the bread and wine, on which account, on their being consecrated to this end, they become the Body and Blood of Christ by the virtue and effects with which they are, or

are to be, endowed ; that the Presence is given necessarily to the spiritual consciousness, and is not conveyed by the elements as presented to external perception ; that the special Presence of the Eucharist depends upon obedience to the commands, "Take, eat," "Drink ye," &c., and is Christ in the active and effort-making powers of man. The elements do not, therefore, come to a full consecration—do not, that is, come to the end of their sacred use and attain that which is the justification of their designation, until communion. They become verily and truly the Body and Blood of Christ when, and in the act of being, received as such.

(2) The second point we propose to examine is : That, since Christ is really present under the forms of bread and wine, He is to be adored as under the veil of the consecrated elements. If the positions at which we have arrived are sound, this second point falls to the ground. But since the matter is one of deep importance, we should not, I think, dismiss it so. And, therefore, in order to examine it, we will assume that the Lord's Presence is given immediately upon consecration, and we will endeavour to ascertain the truth of the

statement, that He should be adored as under the veil of the consecrated elements.

The statement means that in some sense the Lord *is* present under the forms of the consecrated elements, and that the worshipper is to direct his attention to them in worship as to a covering of the Presence. We do not imagine that adoration is to be given to the elements themselves, but to the Lord as present under the forms of bread and wine. In adoration, either the Lord is *perceived* to be present, or He is only *conceived* to be present. There can be no worship without one of these. Is then the Lord *perceived* to be present under the forms of bread and wine? As has been already shown, you cannot *perceive* the Lord under the forms of bread and wine. When you perceive the phenomena of bread and wine, the Lord is excluded from the perception; and when you perceive the Lord, you lose the perception of bread and wine. To perceive, and to worship, with perception, the Lord under the forms of bread and wine, is a psychological impossibility: the two concepts cannot be united and become identical.

But to adore as under the veil of the con-

secrated elements may mean a *conception* of the Lord as present behind the veil, though only the veil of the phenomena of the bread and wine are perceived. There is a conception only that the Lord is present. He is not perceived. He is believed to be present, but not seen. He is not presented as an object of consciousness, but only as an idea in the imagination, *i.e.* in the imaging faculty of the mind. The idea and conception may be perfectly correct; and we will suppose the Lord is personally present behind a veil. But observe, will you, that that conception is not given by the elements, is in no way derived from or determined by them, is not helped in its formation by them. They do not reveal—unveil, but veil and conceal the Presence. In such a case, the entire conception and the spiritual action which enters into adoration is derived from other sources than the elements. They subserve no purpose, except that of an external *sign* of the Presence; they are not the means of it, for they establish no contact between the worshippers and the Worshipped.

Two remarks may be made here: (1) That adoration under the forms of bread and wine

is adoration under that which neither adds to our knowledge of the One worshipped, nor, except in imagination, can be endowed with our previously attained knowledge of Him. The veil of the elements does not, therefore, afford any aid to the exercise of worship, unless it can be said that we worship better when the object of worship is concealed and taken away from consciousness. I have been accustomed to suppose, perhaps erroneously, that Christian worship is peculiarly the worship of the *known*, of One who is revealed—unveiled. “We know what we worship,” and worship what we know ; and that which conveys no idea of God cannot be to us a *form* under which we can adore Him. (2) Again, adoration under the forms of bread and wine gives locality to the object of worship. This may be helpful, if it assists to give definiteness in place of vagueness ; but this is attained by the sacrifice of truth of thought. For the Lord, as the object of worship, is no more present *there* than elsewhere. We may conceive that He is, but our conception is not true. He is, in a sense, present under the forms of bread and wine ; but He is present under all things. It has been said that wherever the Lord is

present He ought to be worshipped. This, though true, requires, as we shall see later on, some very important qualifications. But this is not the same thing as conceiving the Lord to be somewhere locally in order to worship Him *there*, and as being there in a sense in which He is not present and not to be worshipped elsewhere and everywhere. It cannot be safe to consider that the Lord is present in any particular place or under any particular form to the *exclusion* of others. And if this is *not* implied in the Lord's Presence being adored under the veil of the elements, it is difficult to see how the worship of the Lord in the Eucharist is distinguishable from any other adoration which may be given to Him. The only difference that can be made is one which localises Him, and He cannot truly and rightly be localised. How far it is possible to go in this direction, if once we accept the notion, may be seen from what a correspondent some time ago asserted in the *Guardian*—that there is no presence of the Lord in a Church unless the consecrated elements are present.

If the Presence given in the Eucharist under the forms of bread and wine is a Presence to be

worshipped, then, it appears to me, that the Holy Eucharist has nothing except the externals to distinguish it from other modes of worship. On this view, either all other worship is robbed of its essential and vital element—the presence of Jesus Christ with those gathered together in His name, or the Holy Eucharist is emptied of any special and unique grace for the Church, and, instead of being above all other religious acts, is let down to their level. To their level! Rather below them; for to localise Christ and to introduce the veil of material elements, is to introduce an inferior worship to that which is given directly to a spiritual and all-pervading Presence.

And now we must consider the statement that we ought to worship the Lord wherever He is present. This is not quite the same as the unquestionable obligation to worship God everywhere because He is everywhere present. The duty and obligation to worship God wherever and whenever we find Him cannot be too forcibly stated, providing it is *God* we worship, and not merely some activity or functional working of God. But we may make too much of worship—if by worship we mean the adora-

tion and contemplation of the Deity. We make too much of worship, if we make it everything; we make too much of it, if we make it the highest thing in religion. There is something higher than worship, namely, the end for which God desires it, the end for which Christ is raised to honour and glory—"that He may fill all things," that His presence may possess and live in us all. That we, by the indwelling of Christ, reach the full subordination of our whole being to Him, is higher than worship. In the largest sense, "To obey is better than sacrifice." And this, which is universally true, is true of the Eucharist. The highest in it is *not* worship, is not the Presence of the Lord for worship; but His Presence given to His people to reproduce Himself in them in the manifold forms of goodness. And, therefore, the highest sense in which to take His words, "This is my body," "This is my blood," is not to use the consecrated elements as forms under which to adore Him, but as means by which He is received to be within us. To substitute worship of an attributed Presence in them for the reception according to our Lord's command, is to *degrade* the Eucharist from its unique and

exalted place. And even when adoration is not a substitute for reception, it is, nevertheless, to be deprecated, since it is calculated to confuse two diverse uses of the consecrated elements, a lower and a higher, and to cloud, if not conceal, the higher. Indeed, it may be argued, with much reason, that we should best show honour to the Lord's Presence under the forms of bread and wine by not worshipping Him under them, but by reserving to them the more distinctive honour of partaking of them that "we may evermore dwell in him and he in us."

But still, it may be said, Ought not the Lord to be worshipped, as previously suggested, wherever He is present? We agree that He ought to be worshipped everywhere, because He is everywhere present. Now He is also present *in* everything, for "by him all things consist." Is He, therefore, to be worshipped in everything? This can scarcely be affirmed, or we are landed in what is called "fetishism." For "fetishism" is worship given to such things as food, tools, or other kinds of things, because the deity of the worshipper is believed to be *in* them. And there is in this fundamental idea of "fetishism" an important truth, namely, that

God *is in things*, and that their operation, their utility and good are all due to the presence of God. Then why not worship Him *there*? "That would be idolatry," is the ready reply. But why so, if God is to be worshipped wherever He is? Again, God is in every good man in a fuller and truer sense than He is in things. Why not worship Him *there*? Is He not also sacramentally present under the form of the water of Baptism? Then why not worship Him *there* also? "Idolatry" is the answer. But this affirmation of "idolatry" is usually made from an insufficient realisation of the actuality of such presence or from a complete denial of it. *We* cannot accept that position. That cry of idolatry is usually from a denial of any real spiritual presence of God in the things named, and we need, if we would think according to truth, a more vivid faith of God in things. But is it not "fetishism" to believe this? No; but it would be "fetishism" to worship Him under the veil of—say a tree, or an ear of corn. *That* we cannot bring ourselves to do, if we have right notions of God. The affirmation that God is to be worshipped wherever He is needs, therefore, some qualification.

God is not always present for the same end and purpose. He is present in the sun to cause it to yield light and heat, in food to afford nourishment, and in the different useful things to effect their uses. These are functions which His presence works, and such a presence may be called a *functional* presence. It may not be the divine will that He should be adored in a functional presence, and it certainly would not be true worship to adore Him where He does not present Himself with a view to being adored. Does He so present Himself in a functional presence? It may be answered, "No ; because He is not adequately expressed in such functions." But if I have an adequate or a sufficiently adequate conception of Him from other sources of knowledge, may I not, with its aid, worship Him under the forms of things in which He is functionally present, though inadequately expressed? It *seems* as if it might be right to do this. But we have this warning, that it was some such notion as this which was embodied in the Egyptian Theology, the idea of a multitude of functions, and that each was the deity, the same deity being worshipped under differing func-

tions. This was one of the causes of polytheism.

There is possibly a fallacy somewhere. I imagine we may lay it down as a law, that it is the will of God that we give just that regard to His presence in anything which corresponds to the particular function or operation. That is, that we regard the function in the sun, or in food, or in anything, as *His*, and so accept and use things as He bestows them and intends them to be used. Then our attitude to Him corresponds to His relation to us *in things*. But, that when and where He presents Himself to be worshipped, then and there only is He to be worshipped ; and for this end He presents Himself everywhere to the spirit, over, above, and apart from things. The truest reverence for God is not in giving worship to Him in and under every form which is a sign of His presence, but in accepting and using all which He produces according to its purpose, and for no other.

In the statement we are examining, it is affirmed that the Presence of the Lord under the forms of bread and wine is a reason why He should be worshipped under them ; but if

the above line of thought is correct, that would not necessarily follow. We should still have to determine whether the Lord presented Himself there as the object of worship, or for some particular function—a function different from and higher than any other functional presence it may be, but yet having the characteristic common to them, namely, a presence to effect a particular end. That it should transcend all other ends, and be the highest and most spiritual, would not exclude it from the category of a functional presence.

Our previous examination of the Lord's Presence in the Eucharist led us to the conclusion that it is given for the special purpose of communicating Himself to be in us ; that is, the Presence given in the bread and wine is a functional presence. And, therefore, to adore the Lord when so present would not be according to His intention ; and if given to Him under the forms of bread and wine would come near to, if not actually coincide with, the worship of a functional presence as practised in regard to lower things in "fetishism" so called.

Again, the attainment of the true end for us

of any functional presence of God is dependent upon our use of that by which He is present. The use of things, food, or other creatures, as God wills them to be used and received, gives the full benefit of His presence in them. And the full benefit is something more than the thing as a thing ; it is, in a sense, a sacramental benefit—as for example, a deeper realisation of God. It is thus that a right use of God's natural gifts makes them means of spiritual gifts. On the other hand, a wrong use of things in which God is and may be realised as being, cuts off this higher service, and separates from God. If, for example, a functional presence of God be worshipped—say, in an ear of corn—the result is less communion with God. “To worship and serve the creature” is, in this sense, to have the foolish heart darkened.

We must not flinch from the consequences of this line of thought, if it is true. If God did not intend us to adore Christ as present under the veil of the elements (supposing Him to be there), to do so, would be to depart from the end of His Presence there ; and the ultimate result would be the loss of the Presence altogether. Such has always been the consequence

THE HOLY EUCHARIST

THE HOLY EUCHARIST

of worshipping God where He does not present Himself to be worshipped ; and we have no right to assume that any other consequence would follow, if we adore Christ under the forms of bread and wine when He is not there to be adored, but commands them to be received for the highest, holiest function of all, that He may be in us. Thus the very Presence of the Lord may be lost by a false view of His Presence in the Eucharist. It does not follow that if Christ is present under the forms of bread and wine that He should be adored as there.

THE END

Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & Co.
Edinburgh & London

Messrs. Longmans & Co.'s

List of New Books.

GREGORY THE GREAT: His Place in History and Thought. By F. HOMES DUDDEN, B.D., Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. 2 vols. 8vo, 30s. net.

A GREAT ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN—WILLIAM KING, D.D., 1650-1729. His Autobiography, Family, and a Selection from his Correspondence. Edited by Sir CHARLES SIMEON KING, Bart., editor (1892) of Henry's (Rev. Wm., F.R.S.) "Upper Lough Erne in 1739." With 7 Plates and 4 Illustrations in Text. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

STOIC AND CHRISTIAN IN THE SECOND CENTURY. By LEONARD ALSTON, M.A., Melbourne, Burney Prizeman, Cambridge, 1904 and 1905. Crown 8vo, 3s. net.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE OXFORD MOVEMENT. By Sir SAMUEL HALL, M.A., K.C., formerly Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d. net.

WAYSIDE SKETCHES IN ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. Nine Lectures, with Notes and Preface. By CHARLES BIGG, D.D., Canon of Christ Church, and Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford. 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.

CONTENTS.—*Lecture* I. Prudentius. II. Paulinus of Nola. III. Sidonius Apollinaris. IV. Grosseteste. V. Wycliffe. VI. A Kempis. VII. The English Reformation—I. VIII. The English Reformation—II. IX. The English Reformation—III.

THE SPIRITUAL ORDER ; with other Papers and Addresses. Written for the most part in South Africa. By the Rev. GEORGE CONGREVE, of the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley St. John, Oxford. Crown 8vo, 5s. net.

PRINCIPLES OF PARISH WORK: An Essay in Pastoral Theology. By the Rev. CLEMENT F. ROGERS, M.A., author of 'Charitable Relief' in *Handbooks for the Clergy*. Crown 8vo, 5s. net.

PERSECUTION AND TOLERANCE: Being the Hulsean Lectures preached before the University of Cambridge in 1893-94. By MANDELL CREIGHTON, D.D., D.C.L., &c., sometime Bishop of London. New and Cheaper Impression. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.

(THREE NEW VOLUMES.)

Edited by the Rev. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's; and the Rev. DARWELL STONE, M.A., Librarian of the Pusey House, Oxford.

OUR LORD'S RESURRECTION. By the Rev. W. J. SPARROW SIMPSON, M.A., St. Mary's Hospital, Ilford. Crown 8vo, 5s.

* * The purpose of this volume is chiefly apologetic. The writer has endeavoured to consider some of the objections and difficulties raised in modern literature to the central doctrine of our Lord's Resurrection from the dead. Special attention is given to negative criticism originated in Germany, and lately reproduced in English form.

THE PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAL. By the Rev. WALTER HOWARD FRERE, M.A., of the Community of the Resurrection, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Southwark. Crown 8vo, 5s.

THE ATONEMENT. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M.A., Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford. Crown 8vo, 5s.

THE GENUINENESS AND AUTHORSHIP OF THE PASTORAL EPISTLES. By the Rev. J. D. JAMES, M.A., Vicar of Cadoxton-juxta-Neath, formerly Classical Scholar of Magdalene College, Cambridge. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.

CONFESSION AND ABSOLUTION : An Investigation of the Teaching of the Bible and the Prayer Book. By the Rev. ALFRED G. MORTIMER, D.D., Rector of St. Mark's, Philadelphia. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

* * The purpose of this book is to provide a manual which may be placed in the hands of intelligent lay people desirous of informing themselves in regard to the doctrine and practice of Confession and Absolution in the Anglican Church.

NUNC DIMITTIS ; or, The Song of the Watcher for the Lord's Christ. By THOMAS A. GURNEY, M.A., LL.B., Vicar of Emmanuel Church, Clifton, author of "The Living Lord and the Opened Grave." Crown 8vo, 3s. net.

PASTORAL WORK IN COUNTRY DISTRICTS. Lectures delivered in the Divinity School at Cambridge, Lent, 1905. By the Rev. V. S. S. COLES, M.A., Principal of the Pusey House, Oxford. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.

"These lectures ought to be read by country clergymen as often as they read George Herbert's manual, to which they are a not unworthy complement. As they read they will be continually guided in thought, purpose, and devotion, and also in the most practical details of their ministry."—*Church Quarterly Review*.

THE GOSPEL IN THE GOSPELS. By WILLIAM PORCHER DU BOSE, M.A., S.T.D. Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South (U.S.). Crown 8vo, 5s. net.

"I will say what is in my mind at once; it is just the kind of book that English-speaking Christianity is wanting! The world is always in want of a prophet—we at this moment are specially in want of a prophet—and here is one. . . . Dr. Du Bose calls his book 'The Gospel in the Gospels.' It is not a complete picture of the 'Life of Christ.' . . . But it is rather a sustained endeavour to get at the inner spiritual meaning that lies behind all such external presentation. It is a high and serious effort to determine the principles at work in the 'Life of Christ,' to express them in the most compact and abstract form, and to view them in their inner coherence and mutual relations. We might call this a *philosophy* of the Life of Christ; it belongs throughout to the region of philosophy, or philosophical theology, as opposed to that of history or criticism."—Rev. Professor SANDAY, D.D., in the *Expositor*.

AN AGNOSTIC'S PROGRESS. By WILLIAM SCOTT PALMER. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.

"The usual progress of an agnostic is, from some religious belief in which he has been educated, through a transitional stage of philosophical doubt, to an attitude of passive ignorance in face of the ultimate problems of existence. Mr. Palmer's mind, if that usual course be the proper line of advance, has, to put the matter in an Irish way, progressed backwards. He began upon Darwinism, proceeded thence through psychology, metaphysics, and psychical research, to a philosophy of religion, and thus onwards to an established faith in Christianity. His account of the successive changes forms an interesting study in intellectual autobiography, which should be read with a special profit by thinkers interested to show how science and religion may be reconciled."—*Scotsman*.

THE MISSION OF THE HOLY GHOST. By the Rev. G. H. S. WALPOLE, D.D., Rector of Lambeth, Examining Chaplain to the Archbishop of York. Crown 8vo, 2s. net.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PENTATEUCH: An Examination of the Results of the Higher Criticism. By RANDOLPH H. MCKIM, D.D., LL.D., Rector of the Church of the Epiphany, Washington, D.C., U.S. With a Foreword by the Very Rev. H. WACE, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.

PRACTICE AND SCIENCE OF RELIGION: A Study of Method in Comparative Religion. By JAMES HAUGHTON WOODS, Instructor in Philosophy, Harvard University. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.

THE RELATIONS OF FAITH AND LIFE: The Bedell Lectures, 1905. By the Right Rev. ARTHUR C. A. HALL, D.D., LL.D., Bishop of Vermont. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

THE EXAMPLE OF OUR LORD, ESPECIALLY FOR HIS MINISTERS. By the Right Rev. A. C. A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

FOR FAITH AND SCIENCE. By Rev. F. H. WOODS,
B.D., Rector of Bainton, sometime Fellow and Theological
Lecturer of St. John's College, Oxford. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. net.

SPECIAL EDITION IN ONE VOLUME ON THIN PAPER.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JESUS THE MESSIAH.
By ALFRED EDERSHEIM, M.A., D.D., late Grinfield Lecturer on
the Septuagint, Oxford. Two Volumes bound in one and printed
on thin paper. 8vo, 8s. net; or bound in Rexine, gilt top, 9s. net.

HUMILITY: A Devotional Treatise. By the Rev.
JESSE BRETT, L.Th., Chaplain of All Saints' Hospital, East-
bourne. Fcap. 8vo, 2s. net.

A BOOK OF ANGELS. Edited by L. P., Compiler of
the "Inheritance of the Saints." With 12 Rembrandt Gravures.
Crown 8vo, 6s. net.

* * This is a collection of original papers on different subjects con-
nected with Angels contributed by various writers, among whom are the
Dean of Salisbury, the Rev. V. S. S. Coles, Canon Wirgman, Dean Randall,
and the Dean of Grahamstown. There are twelve reproductions of pictures
from medieval and modern artists, and also several poems, some having
been specially written for this book.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO A FUTURE
LIFE. By C. COMYNS TUCKER, late Fellow of University
College, Oxford. Crown 8vo, 1s. 6d. net.

LIBERTY, AND OTHER SERMONS. By the Right Rev.
CHARLES H. BRENT, Bishop of the Philippine Islands. Crown
8vo, 3s. 6d. net.

CORPUS CHRISTI, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By the Rev.
ROBERT VAUGHAN, Rector of Edmundbyers. Crown 8vo.

Handbooks for the Clergy.

(NEW VOLUME.)

PREPARATION FOR CONFIRMATION. By the
Rev. J. P. MAUD, M.A., Vicar of St. Mary Redcliffe, Bristol.
Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY

70887 204

Vaughan, R.

V465

Corpus Christi.

12 FEB
1935

18 FEB
1935

204

V465

70887

